Case of the Week Archive
The Court decided that the materiality of false evidence should be held to the same standard as materiality of counsel’s deficient performance: If the defendant had known the evidence was false, he would not have pled guilty but instead gone to trial.
The law of parties does not apply to a consideration of sudden passion; the jury must consider the whether defendant’s conduct during the crime was taken under sudden passion, regardless of whether the defendant was a principle or a party.
CCP Art. 38.37, allowing evidence of extraneous offenses or acts against children, is consitutional. It serves the same purpose as Federal Rule of Evidence 414 and is narrowly drawn to protect the rights of the defendant.
The pretrial voice identification in this case was upheld using the same reliability factors that the court uses in evaluating a photo ID, even after considering the 20-year time lapse between the crime and the ID.
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.37 is constitutional. Although the general rule is to exclude evidence of extraneous offenses at trial, the Legislature clearly carved out certain exceptions to this rule, including art. 38.37.
Before a court admits retrograde extrapolation testimony, the testifying expert must be found to be reliable. If you desire to have retrograde extrapolation testimony admitted before the jury, the expert witness must be provided as many facts about the defendant as possible, and she must be able to explain her opinion with clarity, including its potential deficiencies.
A defendant can be prosecuted for attempted theft for causing a person to execute a will and filing that will, if he acted with the intent to commit theft, or intent to deprive property from anyone who had a greater right to possession of the property.
The Eighth Amendment does not require a defendant to be able to present mitigating evidence when faced with a mandatory life sentence. Additionally, the mandatory life sentence imposed under Texas Penal Code §12.42(c)(2) is not unconstitutional under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
There is no reasonable expectation under the Fourth Amendment that the results of tests taken for the purpose of medical treatment could not be shared with the police. Additionally, the Texas Medical Practices Act and HIPAA do not protect blood-test results from a valid subpoena.
The term “item” in Penal Code 32.51(b)(1) means each individual piece of identifying information; as such, a single check could contain multiple “items” of information including name, date of birth, and bank account number.
A judge can revisit and increase a defendant’s bond under CCP article 17.09 even after the defendant was previously released on personal bond under CCP article 17.151. If there is a reason for the court to revisit the issue of bail under article 17.09, if bail is “defective, excessive, or insufficient, or for other good and sufficient cause,” the court may do so and may increase bail or add conditions. Read opinion.
It is not a violation of double jeopardy to charge a defendant with capital murder for a death that occurred due to injuries sustained in an aggravated robbery, after defendant’s conviction for the robbery. There is an exception to the double jeopardy rule that allows for a subsequent prosecution on a more serious charge when facts necessary for that charge, here the victim’s death, have not occurred at the time of the original prosecution.
Mental retardation (aka intellectual disability) can be determined in a death penalty case by means other than submission to the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the law is unsettled and trial judges have discretion to decide how to determine intellectual disability including by pretrial determination, submission of a special issue to the jury, or at sentencing.
When the defendant waived the statute of limitations and pled guilty to a time-barred defense, he was not permitted to then raise the statute of limitations on appeal as a bar to his plea. Unless the claim is that a new statute that extends the statute of limitations has amounted to an ex post facto violation, all statute of limitations claims are forfeitable rights. Read the opinion.
When the State chose not to identify XLR-11 by its scientific name in the indictment but instead used the “synthetic chemical compound” language found in Texas Health and Safety Code §481.1031, the indictment was not subject to a motion to quash for being impermissibly vague. The State does not have to name a Penalty Group 2-A substance specifically because the statute’s list of substances contained within the group is non-exhaustive. Read the opinion.
When an officer stopped the defendant for having only one working brake light and subsequently found drugs in the car, the drugs should not have been suppressed after the appeals court determined that the ambiguous traffic statute actually permitted the operation of a vehicle with only one working brake light. An objectively reasonable mistake of law by an officer does not offend the Fourth Amendment. In this case, no North Carolina court had ever held that the officer’s interpretation of the statute was legally incorrect, and both the state appeals court and U.S. Supreme Court concluded the officer’s interpretation of the statute was a reasonable one given the statute’s ambiguous language. Read the opinion.
A jury charge on capital murder under Penal Code §19.03(a)(7) (murder of more than one person in same transaction or pursuant to same scheme) must require the jury to agree on the identity of a predicate murder, and then the identity of at least one additional murder victim. Read the opinion.
It is unconstitutional to perform a blood draw on a driver under the authority of Texas’ implied consent laws when there is no warrant to draw the blood and the driver has explicitly stated he does not consent to the draw. A blood draw is a search, and the implied consent statutes do not create an irrevocable consent that would function as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The court also declined to extend the automobile exception, the special-needs exception, or the search-incident to arrest exception to encompass warrantless blood draws. Read the opinion.
A habeas trial judge is not permitted to subtract points from the defendant’s IQ based on the “Flynn Effect,” a phenomenon by which an IQ test that was written in the past tends to inflate the IQ of a present-day test taker. Factfinders may consider the Flynn Effect and its possible impact on IQ scores generally, just as they may consider the practice effect, potential malingering, the examiner’s behavior, and so forth, but the IQ score itself cannot be changed. Read the opinion.
When the the bailiff removed all spectators from the courtroom prior to voir dire because the room would be too crowded with the 65-member jury panel, the defendant was denied the right to a public trial, even though the court said the spectators could come back in if they wanted but no one ever actually re-entered the courtroom. Read the opinion.
Section 21.15(b)(1) of the improper photography statute, making it illegal to photograph persons in places other than a private dressing room or bathroom under certain circumstances, is facially unconstitutional on 1st Amendment grounds. Banning otherwise protected expression on the basis that it produces sexual arousal or gratification is the regulation of protected thought, and such a regulation is outside the government’s power. Read the opinion.
In an aggregated theft case under Penal Code §31.03, the jury be unanimous, not only as to the total amount stolen from all victims, but also as to the owner and amount of each alleged incident of theft that makes up the aggregated amount. In a case of first impression, the court held that each individually alleged instance of theft is an element of the crime upon which the jury must unanimously agree. When an aggregate theft offense is predicated on §31.03, the jury must unanimously agree about what property was unlawfully appropriated. Read the opinion.
When an arson investigation was conducted in a house used as a daycare soon after the fire had been extinguished, evidence collected in a part of the house that was not damaged by the fire was not subject to suppression. Three factors used by the Supreme Court to analyze the constitutionality of warrantless entry are: 1) whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; 2) whether exigent circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and (3) whether the object of the search is to determine the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity. All three factors weighed against suppression in this case because the house was used as a daycare, the investigation happened promptly after the fire had been extinguished, and the object of the investigation was to determine the cause of the fire. Read the opinion.
1) Implied consent is not the equivalent of voluntary consent for the purposes of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. At least when a defendant refuses to submit to a breath test, that person cannot be said to have freely and voluntarily consented to the search. Language to the contrary from the Court of Criminal Appeals in Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) establishes only that implied consent makes it illegal to refuse a breath or blood test under specific circumstances, and language from Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) specifically stating that implied consent permits warrantless blood draws in Texas is only dicta. Finally, a footnote in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) that appears to endorse Texas’ implied consent statute does not go so far as to approve of warrantless searches under those laws, but it does imply that implied consent can be withdrawn.
2) Warrantless searches under Texas’ “third-strike” implied consent statute are not presumptively reasonable. Warrantless searches are presumed unreasonable and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. To do otherwise creates a per se exception to the warrant requirement, which is prohibited by McNeely. Read the opinion.
The defendant's misdemeanor charge was not barred by limitations when the defendant was indicted a month after his arrest for felony marijuana possession in a school zone, and the prosecution dismissed that indictment two years later and charged him with misdemeanor possession when it became apparent there was a problem with the school-zone allegation. The statute of limitations was tolled by the indictment, and the information contained a paragraph correctly stating that fact. Read the opinion.
The police may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested, unless the facts create an exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances. The sheer volume and diversity of information that is stored on a cell phone makes searching one incident to arrest analogous to searching a giant trunk the arrestee is towing and arguably more invasive than searching the arrestee’s home, both of which would also require a warrant. Read the opinion.
When police asked for permission to retrieve a contact’s phone number from the defendant’s phone, and the defendant responded by consenting and telling them under what name the contact’s number was saved, the police did not exceed the scope of consent when they also searched and photographed the defendant’s call history. The defendant said the number was “saved under” the contact’s name, but an objectively reasonable person could have interpreted that response as a helpful suggestion to the person searching the content of the phone rather than an explicit limitation. Read the opinion.
Texas’s implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutory scheme does not constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The message conveyed by both McNeely and the remand of Aviles is that the Fourth Amendment prohibits per se, categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement. Texas’s implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutes amount to per se, categorical exceptions because they do not take into account the totality of the circumstances presented in each case; they consider only certain facts. Read the opinion.
The defendant's conviction of both aggravated robbery by causing bodily injury and aggravated robbery by threat to the same victim during a single robbery violated double-jeopardy. Although the majority opinion does not establish the reasoning behind the holding, a concurring opinion by Presiding Judge Keller and a sepearte concurrence by Judge Cochran give insight into the holding. Read the opinion, Presiding Judge Keller's concurrence, and Judge Cochran's concurrence.
A warrant may be based on evidence collected by an undercover officer who is physically outside of his jurisdiction. Although the officer has no authority as a peace officer outside of his jurisdiction and is essentially acting as a citizen, there is nothing illegal about a citizen gathering that evidence. Read the opinion.
A mandatory life sentence for a juvenile is constitutional under Miller v. Alabama. A court must make an individualized determination of the appropriateness of a life without parole sentence if the defendant is a juvenile, but not if the juvenile is facing a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole. Read the opinion.
When a driver called 911 to report a specific make, model, and license number of a truck that had just run her off the road at a specific mile marker, that information was sufficient to provide law enforcement with reasonable suspicion to perform an investigative stop for DWI. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated. The tip, even if anonymous, was from an eyewitness and described behavior consistent with DWI; the officer’s corroboration of the truck’s description and location established that the tip was reliable enough to justify a traffic stop. Read the opinion.
Implied consent does not provide an exception to the warrant requirement for a warrantless blood draw. By vacating and remanding a case from the San Antonio court of appeals,Aviles v. State, 385 S.W.3d 110, the United States Supreme Court has rejected any position that would treat Transportation Code §724.012(b)(3)(B) as an exception to the Fourth Amendment. To the extent that §724.012(b)(3)(B) can be read to permit a warrantless seizure of a suspect’s blood without exigent circumstances or consent, it violates the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Read the opinion.
The court refused the petition for review on the question of whethr or not the “innocent owner” provision of the asset forfeiture statute was unconstitutional because it requires a petitioner to prove his innocence rather than requiring the State to prove he is not innocent. Although the dissent believed the issue was ripe for review, the concurrence noted that the question has already been answered by the court and affirmed repeatedly by the United States Supreme Court. Read the dissent and the concurrence.
The State violated the defendant’s double-jeopardy rights when it convicted him twice on two separate counts of family violence that both relied on a common violent act. The overlap of two of the same underlying instances of bodily-injury assault against the same victim during the same time period was not constitutionally permissible. Read the opinion.
The defendant could not be found guilty of misapplication of fiduciary property on the theory that he was acting in a fiduciary capacity when he took payments from customers for window treatments and then failed to deliver those goods as promised. For the first time, the court created a definition for the statutorily undefined term “fiduciary capacity” and held that “one acts in a fiduciary capacity for purposes of the statute if his relationship with another is based not only on trust, confidence, good faith, and utmost fair dealing, but also on a justifiable expectation that he will place the interest of the other party before his own.” Although the defendant clearly acted contrary to an agreement with which his customers trusted him to comply, there was no evidence as to a justifiable expectation that he would place their interest before his own. Read the opinion.
The Supreme Court’s prohibition against mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders announced in Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively. Because Miller completely removes a punishment from the list of punishments that can be imposed on a particular class, it is a new substantive rule and should be applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane. Read the opinion.
If a person objects to police making a warrantless search of his residence, and police physically remove him from the residence, the police can make a warrantless search with the consent of the remaining co-occupant. Under Georgia v. Randolph, a person’s objection to a search of a residence is not effective unless he is physically present. As soon as he is removed, his objection is also removed. Read the opinion.
Polic cannot make a warrantless search of a cell-phone in a jail property room that is confiscated as part of a booking-inventory procedure and not incident to arrest. A person retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his cell phone when the phone is being temporarily stored in a jail property room. Searching a person’s cell phone is like searching that person’s home desk, computer, bank vault, and medicine cabinet all at once. Read the opinion.