A court may consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a long-delayed habeas application is barred by the doctrine of laches. The federal standard requiring the State to show particularized prejudice and a complete inability to answer the application is no longer workable. The courts can consider other forms of prejudice, such as the State’s inability to retry the defendant, and weigh them against equitable considerations in favor of granting relief, like new evidence of actual innocence.
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The State cannot appeal from a trial court’s order rejecting a plea-bargain agreement and signing a judgment finding the defendant not guilty. The trial court’s ruling reached the merits of the case and constituted an acquittal. The State cannot appeal from an acquittal, and the judgment did not constitute a dismissal of an indictment.
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Probable cause to believe that illegal drugs are in a home, coupled with an odor of marijuana emanating from the home and a police officer making his presence known to its occupants, does not justify warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement without some proof of imminent destruction based on affirmative conduct of the occupants. The five factors for consideration established in McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), are no longer adequate.
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To establish prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving plea-bargaining, the habeas applicant must show a reasonable probability that: 1) he would have accepted the earlier offer if counsel had not given ineffective assistance; 2) the prosecution would not have withdrawn the offer; and 3) the trial court would not have refused to accept the plea bargain.
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Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)—holding that defense counsel can render ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately admonish a defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea— does not apply retroactively to cases already final on appeal. Padilla broke new ground by changing the law in most jurisdictions; thus, it “developed” new law. Under Teague v. Lane, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989) a new law does not apply to convictions already final on direct appeal.
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Even after the advent of HIPAA, a person lacks standing to complain about the use of a grand jury subpoena to obtain his blood-alcohol test results; however, he may challenge how the State obtained his medical records. Although the grand jury subpoena used in this case was invalid, the taint of the illegal subpoena was attenuated by the subsequent valid clerk’s subpoena, so the remaining medical records were admissible.
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The State is entitled to mandamus relief when a trial judge has refused a jury instruction on a theory of party liability alleged by the State and increased the State’s burden of proof with regard to the conspiracy theory of party liability. The State has no other remedy at law, and the judge has a ministerial duty to submit the requested instructions if they are applicable to the offense as charged and supported by the evidence.
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The trial court improperly granted a motion for new trial in the interest of justice on the ground that the jury did not hear exculpatory testimony from an alleged eyewitness; defense counsel was “undisputedly aware of the exculpatory evidence before trial but consciously decided, on the record, not to call the witness at trial.” An argument that counsel was ineffective was expressly abandoned, and another that the sentence was grossly disproportionate was not presented to the trial court.
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The trial court wrongly found an officer’s information at the time of a defendant’s arrest—that the defendant, who had a common name, had two prior DWI convictions—unreliable under Tex. Transp. Code §724.012(b)(3)(B). The later discovery that the information obtained from NCIC/TCIC was wrong does not make it unreliable at the time the officer used it in the field.
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The CCA overruled its earlier holding in Erdman v. State and clarified that a court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an extra-statutory warning bears a causal relationship with the decision to provide a breath specimen. In this case, the officer was merely responding to the defendant’s questions and did not provide any untrue information when stating her intent to get a blood warrant; based on the totality of the circumstances, the statements were not coercive. Fienen v. State Read opinion

The admissibility of an expert’s testimony regarding future dangerousness is not a cognizable issue for habeas corpus review. Although the court found the expert’s testimony inadmissible under TRE 702 in an unrelated case on direct appeal, claims regarding the admissibility of evidence under the rules of evidence are not appropriate for habeas review. Ex parte Ramey Read opinion

An officer's testimony that if the car in front had stopped, the car following would have been unable to do so without colliding, established he had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop. The facts exceeded those in Ford v. State where an officer's conclusory testimony that a car was following another too closely was  insufficient for reasonable suspicion. Young v. State Read opinion

The trial court improperly excluded affidavits and testimony regarding a juror’s Internet research on date rape drugs under TRE 606(b) at a hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial because the Internet research occurred outside the jury room deliberations and was an “outside influence” for the purposes of TRE 606(b). McQuarrie v. State Read opinion

Inclusion of the per se definition of intoxication in the abstract portion of the jury charge did not improperly expand the allegations against the defendant when the information alleged only the subjective definition because the application paragraph tracked the language of the information and restricted the jury’s consideration to only the allegations contained in the information. Crenshaw v. State Read opinon

An officer did not violate the 4^th Amendment when he seized an arrestee’s car keys and used them to trigger the car alarm so as to identify the associated car; the arrestee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his car and failed to demonstrate how triggering the car alarm button violated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the encrypted code, which the officers did not attempt to discover.

The admission of 9-1-1 calls reporting an ongoing drug deal, not an emergency, did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the statements were not testimonial; the primary purpose of the interrogation was not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.

U.S. v. Polidore: Read Opinion

Reckless aggravated assault is the lesser-included offense of intentional or knowing aggravated assault. Hicks v. State. Read Opinion

The trial court wrongly granted a provision of a defense omnibus discovery motion requiring the State to turn over NCIC and TCIC records of law enforcement officers for an in camera inspection. Although the State failed to advise the trial court that no such record existed (so the trial court was denied the opportunity to rule on the issue that the State would have to create the document), neither Brady v. Maryland, nor CCP art. 39.14 impose a duty on the State to acquire the information. Moreover, there were 1) no oral or written request for the records, 2) no oral or written showing of “good cause” for the records, 3) no oral or written showing why those records were material to the defense, and 4) no oral or written showing that those records were in the State's possession.

In re Craig Watkins
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The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit retrying a defendant for capital murder and first-degree murder when the trial judge granted a mistrial after the jury informed him that it unanimously agreed the defendant was not guilty of those offenses, but hung on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The defendant was not acquitted of the greater charges. The jury had not finally resolved anything and could have revisited the greater charges before rendering a verdict.

Blueford v. Arkansas
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A blood draw search warrant to be executed in a designated county may not be issued by a statutory county court judge of a different county. Statutory county court judges lack the authority to issue a search warrant to be executed outside of their own county.

Sanchez v. State
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The defendant was not entitled to a new trial because she was denied adequate funding to hire additional and better qualified experts, and because trial counsel was ineffective by failing to retain or make a written request for additional qualified experts. A defendant is not entitled to the best or most expensive expert, but is entitled to at least one expert upon a showing that the expert can provide assistance which is likely to be a significant factor at trial. The defendant forfeited consideration of her constitutional claim on habeas review by failing to file a proper written Ake motion and ensuring the trial judge formally ruled on it. The defendant does not have a constitutional right to a “team of experts” paid for by the taxpayers, and defendant’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to request such a team.

Ex parte Jimenez
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When a defendant appeals his conviction, the State does not need to file its own notice of appeal when it raises a cross point concerning a ruling on a question of law under CCP art. 44.01(c). Once a convicted defendant files a timely notice of appeal, the appellate courts have jurisdiction to address any pertinent “cross-appeal“ or ”rebuttal“ issues raised by the State. There is no statutory provision for filing a notice of appeal for “cross-appeals” under art. 44.01(c) and no evidence that the legislature intended for the State to file a notice of appeal. There is no persuasive rationale for requiring such notice of appeal when the State's right to have the court of appeals address its issue on a trial court's ruling of law is contingent upon the defendant obtaining relief from his conviction.

Pfeiffer v. State
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The trial court did not violate a defendant’s rights to due process and due course of law by refusing to answer a jury question regarding consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The policy decisions of other courts throughout the nation do not rise to the level of a due process right or a due course of law right. CCP art. 46C.154, as the trial court applied it here, does not “offend some principle of justice so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” and the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court applied the mandatory prohibition of article 46C.154 in a manner that deprived appellant of fundamental fairness.

Lockard v. State
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