Texas Courts of Appeals
Munoz v. State
No. 01-20-00469-CR 6/28/22
Issue:
Does Transportation Code §545.060(a) require the State to prove that a driver both failed to maintain a lane and switched lanes unsafely?
Holding:
Yes. The 1st Court of Appeals joined the 3rd, 13th, and 14th Courts of Appeals, which have all held that the State must prove both elements, unlike the Court of Criminal Appeals’s plurality holding in Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), which held that the statute provides two ways to commit the offense. In this case, however, the 1st Court concluded that the State proved both elements, which justified the officer’s stop of Munoz. Read opinion.
Dissent (Landau, J.):
The dissent agreed that §545.060(a) requires proof of both elements—rather than provides two ways to commit the offense—but disagreed that the State met its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for the stop. Read dissent.
Commentary:
Remember that a plurality opinion or ruling does not carry any precedential weight. Thus, in the wake of Leming, a growing split among the intermediate appellate courts has developed. Several intermediate appellate courts have decided this issue the other way and opted to follow the plurality view of the CCA in Leming, including the 2nd, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Court of Appeals. Until the CCA decides to revisit this issue and make a statewide, authoritative ruling one way or the other, it is imperative that you are familiar with how your local intermediate appellate court (or courts, if you’re near the Houston area, where the 1st and 14th Courts of Appeals share jurisdiction) has ruled on the matter, so that you can properly educate regional law enforcement and prove what you must to substantiate a traffic stop under §545.060(a).
Shook v. State
No. 10-21-00101-CR 6/29/22
Issue:
Are trial judges required to give admonitions under Faretta when a defendant electing to proceed pro se has access to appointed standby counsel?
Holding:
No. Because the defendant consulted with his standby counsel, the judge was not required to provide the defendant with the more formal admonishments from Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In a footnote, however, the Court stated, “[T]he better course for any trial judge is to provide Faretta warnings to a defendant in any case where he or she has at any time expressed any desire to engage in self-representation. Giving such warnings, early and often, provides meaningful information to permit a defendant to make rational and well-thought-out decisions. Giving them in writing, and asking the defendant to acknowledge receipt of the warnings in writing as well, provides the defendant with even greater understanding of the rights (and perils) of self-representation.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Gray, C.J.):
“I must disagree in the strongest way with [the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th Courts of Appeals], and now my colleagues on this Court, who hold or suggest that if stand-by counsel is appointed, there is no need to admonish the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Read dissent.
Commentary:
A trial court can appoint standby counsel to assist a pro se defendant at trial, even if the defendant objects. However, because the trial court cannot force a pro se defendant to actually consult with or utilize the appointed standby attorney, Faretta warnings about the dangers of self-representation are the better approach, even if not required in these circumstances.
Attorney General Opinion Request
RQ-0465 6/28/22
Issue:
Is an individual convicted of a felony in another state whose “rights of citizenship” have been restored by the other state eligible to run for office in Texas under Election Code §141.001? Read opinion request.
Requested by:
Anna D. Hord, Hockley County Attorney