Texas Courts of Appeals

Jefferson v. State

No. 14-23-00738-CR                   8/28/25

Issue:

Does the offense of injury to a child by omission (Penal Code §22.04) apply to professionals?

Holding:

Yes. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the injury-by-omission statute applies only to a child’s parents or guardians. “[T]he statute’s plain language contains no such limitation and instead explicitly provides that it applies to anyone under a legal or statutory duty to act, not jury parents or guardians.” The Court also concluded that the jury “could have formed reasonable inferences and used its common sense to determine that a dentist’s failure to call 911 for hours when a child patient is suffering from seizures and in a hypoxic state, given the dentist’s training and experience indicating that the dentist understood the seriousness of the patient’s conditions and vitals, was reckless as needed to support the mental state for a conviction for recklessly causing injury to a child by omission.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

This is a great win for the State and emphasizes that there is no familial- or guardian-relationship-only loophole for this type of offense. In reaching this holding, the appellate court relies on established CCA precedent, so this published decision should withstand any challenge by the defendant via a petition for discretionary review to the CCA. Additionally, the appellate court’s sufficiency analysis is fact-intensive and thorough, and should prove useful to prosecutors who work with these types of cases as a great example of what evidence demonstrates recklessness.

State v. Martin

No. 04-23-01087-CR                   8/28/25

Issue:

Should evidence of child pornography found by the defendant’s ex-girlfriend on the defendant’s cell phone have been suppressed?

Holding:

Yes. Even though the cell phone did not have a passcode or other security measures, the ex-girlfriend did not have a greater right to possession to the phone than the defendant, and therefore, her search for information on the cell phone was not consensual. An objectively reasonable officer preparing a warrant affidavit to continue the search of the cell phone’s contents “should have known that the evidence of child pornography provided by [the ex-girlfriend] was obtained by theft and breach of computer security. Either crime alone would suffice for the statutory exclusion of the evidence.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the warrant was not obtained under an objectively reasonable belief that the information supporting it was untainted, and the good-faith exception of CCP Art. 38.23(b) was not met. Read opinion.

Commentary:

The appellate court’s holding that the good-faith exception of Article 38.23(b) is inapplicable is premised upon the trial court’s findings of fact, which credit the defendant’s testimony almost exclusively. If the trial court had credited the ex-girlfriend’s account of events, instead, as the investigating officers did, the facts arguably show that the girlfriend had apparent authority regarding the device, and that she did not clearly commit theft or breach of computer security when she took or accessed the phone. The phone lacked a passcode, was stored in a safe to which the ex-girlfriend had common access, and the defendant permitted the ex-girlfriend to use the phone at times, without clear limitation of consent. As such, because it does not appear unequivocal that the ex-girlfriend violated the law, the appellate court’s conclusion that an objectively reasonable officer preparing a search warrant affidavit for the phone should have known that the child pornography found on the phone was obtained through commission of those crimes seems shakier than the appellate court represents. That being said, though, trial courts’ findings of fact are difficult for the losing party to overcome on appeal, as this case demonstrates. Other cases that are similar in nature but have a different outcome usually arise in the opposite procedural posture—the defendant appealing the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, when the trial court has issued findings that are unfavorable to the defendant.  

Texas Attorney General Opinions

KP-0496                                8/29/25

Issue:

May a fee collected under Local Gov’t Code §118.0216 by the county clerk for records management and preservation be used for a project that includes records of the district clerk?

Conclusion:

The records management and preservation fee collected by a county clerk pursuant to Local Government Code §118.011(b)(2) may be used only for documents filed and recorded with the county clerk, in accordance with §118.0216(a). This would not, however, prevent the county clerk’s office from contributing a pro rata share of those fees to a joint records management and preservation project with the district clerk’s office. Read opinion.

Requested by:

Josh Tetens, McLennan County Criminal District Attorney

Parole Laws & Appellate Rules

Because of space limitations, TDCAA is no longer able to include the parole laws (Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 508) or Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure in its code books. However, we have created two free, printable PDFs that contain the 2025 versions of each. Download the parole laws here and the TRAPs here.