Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
State v. Newton
No. PD-0364-24 7/30/25
Issue:
Does Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 14.03(a)(1) require exigent circumstances for a warrantless arrest?
Holding:
No. In Armstrong v. State, No. PD-0409-22 (Tex. Crim. App. May 28, 2025), the Court explicitly held that Art. 14.03(a)(1), which deals with warrantless arrests in “suspicious places,” does not have an exigency requirement. “The issue as to whether [the defendant’s] house was a suspicious place under article 14.03(a)(1) is not before us, and we therefore express no opinion as to whether [the] court of appeals or the trial court [was] correct with regard to whether [the defendant] was found in a suspicious place.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This very short decision is only significant because it reaffirms the court’s prior holding in Armstrong that there is no requirement for the State to show exigent circumstances in attempting to justify a warrantless arrest under Art. 14.03(a)(1). The defendant asked the court of appeals to follow three prior decisions that arguably required a showing of exigent circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals does not expressly overrule those decisions. But whether those three decisions have been overruled by this decision, or by Armstrong, they are no longer good law.
Ex parte Kleinman
Nos. PD-0966–0974-24 7/30/25
Ex parte Auspro Enterprises
Nos. PD-0975–0980-24 7/30/25
Issue:
Is pretrial habeas relief available to defendants who have been charged with a Class C misdemeanor fine-only offense and are not in custody or have not been released from custody on bond?
Holding:
Yes. The Court noted that while the defendant (accused of running a “head shop”) and his business have not been jailed or incarcerated based on convictions for Class C offenses, they have had multiple complaints filed against them, been convicted in municipal court, and posted appeal bonds of almost $65,000. “We conclude that at least in combination, these circumstances have accrued to cause the defendants to fall under ‘the kind of control which one person exercises over another … to subject [them] to the general authority and power’ of the State. … In short, [the defendants] have been ‘restrained’ according to [Code of Criminal Procedure] Articles 11.01, 11.09, and 11.23.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
In order to pursue an application for a writ of habeas corpus—pretty much any kind of writ of habeas corpus—a defendant must be “restrained in his liberty.” This decision underscores the fact that, in this context, “restraint” is defined very, very broadly, and it has been so construed for quite some time. At least decades, if not longer. Therefore, it was not difficult at all in this case for the court to find that these defendants were “restrained” because they had complaints filed against them, they had been convicted (at least preliminarily), and they had made appeal bonds in attempting to challenge those convictions. This decision will not be of interest only to post-conviction prosecutors. If a prosecutor is faced with any kind of application for a writ of habeas corpus, even a pre-trial or a pre-conviction writ, this decision will help reveal just how broadly “restraint” is defined in these cases.
Ex parte Carter
No. WR-70,722-03 7/30/25
Issue:
Does an expert’s purported change of opinion about a cause of death fall under the “new science” habeas writ set out in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.073?
Holding:
No. To be entitled to habeas relief under Article 11.073, an applicant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been convicted if newly available scientific evidence had been presented at trial. “A difference of opinion between experts is inadequate to render [a medical examiner’s] trial testimony false or misleading,” and the Court concluded that the defendant did not show that the medical examiner had actually changed his opinion. Therefore, the defendant had not met the burden of proof on his Article 11.073 claim. “We conclude that the habeas court admitted several pieces of evidence that exceeded the scope of the claims that Applicant raised, and we will not consider it. Rejecting this evidence and properly limiting our analysis to only the evidence that should have been considered, Applicant does not meet his burden on his false evidence claim or his new science claim.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Walker, J., joined by Richardson and Newell, JJ):
“Instead of conducting its own independent review of the record sent to us by the trial court, the majority of this Court decides that it does not want to consider the evidence and throws it out, because, in the majority’s view, the evidence is not pertinent to the claims Carter raised in his application, and the majority chides the trial court for admitting the evidence. And without the evidence, the majority of course concludes that Carter fails to meet his burden to show he is entitled to relief. The record evidence sent to us by the trial court is relevant and probative of Carter’s claims, and the trial court was well within its role to admit it. Because the Court mistakenly decides that the evidence is outside the scope of Carter’s claims, and therefore mistakenly concludes that Carter is not entitled to relief, I respectfully dissent.” Read dissent.
Commentary:
These types of cases are often very fact-bound and, therefore, may be of little use to future prosecutors handling these types of claims. That is not the case with this decision, which should be quite helpful in future cases. The key holding is found on pages 35-36 of the court’s very lengthy opinion: A defendant cannot claim that an expert has given false or misleading testimony merely because the defendant has found another expert who offers a different opinion. After that key holding, the court goes on to explain how it did not matter—in this case—whether the expert’s prior testimony was false because it was not material. There was more than enough evidence in this case—of the regular, non-expert variety—showing that the defendant was guilty of an intentional killing. Post-conviction prosecutors will also be interested in this decision because it gives good guidance as to what evidence a habeas court should consider when handling these types of claims.
Texas Courts of Appeals
In the Matter of A.T., a Juvenile
No. 05-24-01108-CV 7/25/25
Issue:
Has a grand jury’s certificate of approval sufficiently authorized determinate sentencing if it includes the names of the alleged offenses but leaves out the statutory cite for one of them?
Holding:
Yes. In an issue of first impression in the 5th Court of Appeals, the Court concluded: “Although the certificate did not recite the statutory provision for aggravated robbery as it did for aggravated kidnapping, we cannot conclude this omission means the grand jurors failed to certify aggravated robbery for determinate sentencing as [the juvenile defendant] contends.” Family Code §53.045 requires certification of the petition but does not require a specific way the offenses must be alleged. Read opinion.
Commentary:
Juvenile defendants often claim that the failure to do something in a juvenile proceeding, or doing something not precisely as hoped for, is jurisdictional. This decision is another common-sense breath of fresh air that not every incompletion and not every uncrossed T or undotted I is fatal. There are certain requirements that must be followed, to be sure. (Case in point: See the decision below). But the type of (alleged) mistake involved in this case does not preclude jurisdiction. The decision also has a good analysis for upholding a deadly weapon finding in a juvenile case, where the juvenile defendant has judicially confessed to the deadly weapon finding.
In the Matter of F.M.V.
No. 08-24-00077-CV 7/29/25
Issue:
Does the requirement for taking a juvenile’s written statement before a magistrate with no officers “present” as required by Family Code §51.095, refer to visual presence or whether the officers are within hearing distance while the magistrate and juvenile converse?
Holding:
Visual presence. “[I]n a case such as this where the magistrate has expressed no fear of the juvenile, the Legislature intended that the magistrate review the juvenile’s statement outside the visual presence of law enforcement to avoid the juvenile being subjected to any feelings of intimidation or coercion from such presence.” The Court concluded that even though the jail magistrate’s office had no designated Juvenile Processing Office, its alternative procedure of conducting interviews with juveniles on the street with law enforcement officers stationed at a distance close enough to ensure public safety but far enough away to ensure that the officers could not hear the magistrate’s and juvenile’s conversation did not comply with §51.095. The Court found that the Family Code does not require that a meeting with a magistrate to review a juvenile’s statement can take place only in a designated juvenile processing office. “By no means do we suggest that there is only one way to promote the safeguards inherent in the Family Code. We heed the State’s caution against adopting a rule that requires a ‘rigid separation of the magistrate, juvenile, and officers.’ But here, we find no need to adopt a hard-and-fast rule that would limit the locations where an interview may take place or provide an exact description of where a law enforcement officer may be positioned during such an interview, as the record in this case clearly reflects that the requirements of the Code were not met under the unique facts of this case.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision is one of pure statutory construction, and it is thoroughly reasoned. Unlike the (alleged) jurisdictional argument raised in the prior decision, this decision deals with the admissibility of a juvenile statement, in which the controlling statute has been construed to have very particular requirements that must be followed. It has long been held that law enforcement must not be present when a juvenile’s statement is being reviewed by the magistrate. If that cannot be accommodated well, as appears to be the claim made in this particular case, accommodations must nevertheless be made. Law enforcement must not be present.