Case Summaries

Each week, TDCAA staff members summarize the most important cases from Texas and federal criminal courts and provide insightful commentary on how those cases could impact the criminal justice system as well as a link to the opinions. Find a library of previous Weekly Case Summaries here.

Summaries

October 10, 2025

Court of Criminal Appeals

Ex parte Roberson

Nos. WR-63,081-03 through -07                           10/9/25

Issue:

Should the defendant receive an emergency stay of execution to consider his claim that the Court of Criminal Appeals’s opinion in Ex parte Roark entitles him to relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 11.073 regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome evidence?

Holding:

Yes. In a per curiam unpublished opinion, the Court remanded the defendant’s 11.073 claim to the trial court and limited its remand to that issue. Read opinion.

Concurrence (Richardson, J.):

The concurrence noted that as identified in Roark, scientific understanding of Shaken Baby Syndrome has significantly advanced. “[T]he term ‘blunt force’ was presented in a way that permitted the jury to equate it to shaking. That can make a significant difference in a capital murder prosecution.” Read concurrence.

Concurrence and Dissent (Schenck, P.J.):

“I concur in this decision to the extent it prevents what I see as Roberson’s potentially unconstitutional execution in view of evidence undermining his conviction and sentence. I dissent to the remand, as this will likely only serve to delay the ultimate merits resolution to which both the State and Roberson are entitled.” Read concurrence and dissent.

Concurrence and Dissent (Yeary, J., joined by Parker, J.):

“To reopen a subsequent writ application that has already been disposed of—if it is ever appropriate—may be justified only under the most extraordinary of circumstances. … That a reasonable, good faith argument can be made that our prior decision to dismiss the … subsequent writ application was, in hindsight, ‘incorrect’ does not count as an appropriate basis to entertain a suggestion for reconsideration.” Read concurrence and dissent.

Concurrence and Dissent (Finley, J.):

“My disagreement with the Court is rather limited: Unlike the Court, I would also remand [Roberson’s] actual innocence claims in his … habeas applications. I see little distinction between the bases for [his] Article 11.073 claims and [his] actual innocence claims. Consequently, I join the Court’s remand order but dissent insofar as the Court declines to remand [Roberson’s] actual innocence claims.” Read concurrence and dissent.

Concurrence and Dissent (Parker, J.):

“One of [the defendant’s] main and persistent claims is that the scientific theory of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ has been discredited. But we need not concern ourselves with the status of that scientific theory here. [The defendant’s] case is not a ‘shaken baby’ case. It is not even a so-called ‘shaken impact’ case, in which shaking is stopped by an impact on a pillow or other soft object, which then purportedly causes the baby’s brain to crash into the inside of the skull. This case is a ‘blunt-force trauma’ case. A shaking or ‘soft’ impact cannot explain the ‘boggy’ spot on the two-year-old child’s head, the two different kinds of bleeding outside the skull, the bruising on the face and ears, and the bleeding from a tear in the mouth.” Read concurrence and dissent.

Dissent (Keel, J., joined by Parker, J.):

“The Court rewards [the defendant’s] abuse of the writ with an unmerited and pointless remand of his perennial challenge to cause-of-death testimony offered at his trial. The remand is unmerited because [he] has not met Article 11.073’s unavailability or materiality requirements or overcome Article 11.071’s subsequent writ bar.” Read dissent.

Commentary:

The myriad opinions issued by most of the judges on the court highlight the wide disparity of views on this subject, with some judges dissenting to granting any relief to the defendant, and with some judges dissenting to the court’s failure to grant even more relief to the defendant: 

  • Presiding Judge Schenck would—immediately, without any remand—grant the defendant an entirely new trial. Concluding on page 32 of his lengthy opinion, he also wrote in favor of a much reduced burden—preponderance of the evidence—for an actual-innocence claim raised under the Texas Constitution. 
  • Judge Finley would grant a remand on the defendant’s actual-innocence claims, as well as his claim under Art. 11.073. Judge Finley also spent a great deal of time arguing that the defendant’s case is a shaken-baby case, and not a blunt-force-trauma case. 
  • Judge Parker strenuously disagreed with that suggestion, and she would distinguish this case from Roark, upon which the majority has apparently heavily relied. She would not remand this case back to the trial court. 
  • Judge Yeary also opposed granting any relief to the defendant and appears ready to reject the court’s prior holding in Roark. It appears that Judge McClure would also oppose granting a remand under Art. 11.073. 
  • At the other end of the spectrum from Presiding Judge Schenck’s and Judge Finley’s opinions is the opinion of Judge Keel, who contended that the defendant has not met the statutory requirements of Art. 11.073. 

As with Roark, this decision is probably of little value to child-abuse prosecutors because prosecutor approaches and expert testimony on these types of injuries has significantly changed. This decision will be of interest to post-conviction prosecutors, and those prosecutors are faced with difficulties in determining if a consensus can be determined from this wide array of opinions from the various members of the court. The Court will almost certainly be faced with some difficult decisions when faced with other claims under Art. 11.073 or actual-innocence claims.

Attorney General Opinion Requests

No. 0620-KP                     10/6/25

Issue:

May a county commissioners court accept a monetary donation from an anonymous donor? Read opinion request.

Requested by:

Courtney Ponthier, Newton County Criminal DA

2025 Special Session Changes

In its second special session, the 89th Legislature passed several bills that amended the Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Family Code. Most of these changes take effect on 12/4/25, and they will impact TDCAA’s 2025 code books, which contain only changes made in the regular session. Click here for a printable and downloadable copy of all of these special session changes.

Correction to the Penal Code

In TDCAA’s Criminal Laws of Texas, we mistakenly omitted sections from Penal Code §20.05 that had been passed in the 3rd Special Session of 2023 and became effective Feb. 6, 2024. (This error does not appear in the spiral-bound Penal Laws of Texas book.) We apologize for the error and have produced a replacement page for that book. For replacement page 34 in Criminal Laws of Texas, click here for a PDF, which you can download.

TDCAA is pleased to offer these unique case summaries from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court, the Texas Courts of Appeals and the Texas Attorney General. In addition to the basic summaries, each case will have a link to the full text opinion and will offer exclusive prosecutor commentary explaining how the case may impact you as a prosecutor. The case summaries are for the benefit of prosecutors, their staff members, and members of the law enforcement community. These summaries are NOT a source of legal advice for citizens. The commentaries expressed in these case summaries are not official statements by TDCAA and do not represent the opinions of TDCAA, its staff, or any member of the association. Please email comments, problems, or questions to Joe Hooker.