Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
State v. Cuarenta
No. PD-0205-24 1/22/25
Issue:
May the State appeal an order of deferred disposition under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 44.01(b), which allows the State to “appeal a sentence in a case on the ground that the sentence is illegal”?
Holding:
No. Resolving a split between intermediate courts of appeals, the Court ruled that an order of deferred disposition is not a “sentence” within the meaning of Art. 44.01(b). “An order of deferred disposition does not order that the punishment be carried into execution, nor does it revoke a suspension of the imposition of a sentence. Therefore, it is not a sentence.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
We finally have a definitive answer from the CCA as to what right the State has to appeal an order of deferred disposition or deferred adjudication: none. Remember that the State’s right of appeal is narrower than defendants’ right of appeal and is restricted to only those grounds that are specifically listed in Article 44.01. Interpreting the pertinent portions of that article, the CCA informs us that the State cannot appeal an order of deferred disposition or deferred adjudication under Art. 44.01(a) because such an order is not one of the orders specifically enumerated in that subsection. Likewise, the State cannot appeal an order of deferred disposition or deferred adjudication under Article 44.01(b) because such an order is not an appealable “sentence,” given how “sentence” is defined by Article 42.02.
Although the Court’s holding is simple, the effects of it are less so because it creates a loophole wherein a trial court could enter an order of deferred disposition or deferred adjudication that is erroneous in any number of ways (e.g., where the defendant is legally ineligible for community supervision, as in this case, or where the terms of the community supervision ordered are improper for some reason) and the State cannot appeal the order to try to rectify the error(s). So, what can the State do in these circumstances? First, in the short term, the CCA specifically left open the question of whether the State can seek relief from an allegedly improper order of deferred disposition or deferred adjudication via a writ of mandamus or prohibition. Given that we now know that the State can’t appeal here, it would appear that the State does not have an adequate remedy at law in these circumstances and, thus, mandamus or prohibition should be viable. Second, as a longer-term solution, perhaps the legislature would consider a change to Article 44.01 to specifically allow the State to appeal these types of orders, or to Article 42.02 to modify the definition of “sentence” to be broad enough to cover these types of orders.
State v. Hatter
No. PD-0160-24 1/22/25
Issue:
Was the State bound to the terms of a proposed plea bargain even though the defendant never agreed to the terms and the plea bargain agreement was never brought to the trial judge for approval?
Holding:
No. Unless a trial judge accepts a plea agreement and the parties have agreed to the terms, the contract of a plea agreement is not binding on the parties. “It is undisputed that the State made a plea offer, but that is as far as it went. The State offered to dismiss Appellee’s felony case in exchange for Appellee’s plea of guilty in the driving while intoxicated cases. Appellee and the State agree that these were the terms of the plea offer. But that plea offer never became a binding plea bargain agreement.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is a great win for the State, after considerable back-and-forth between the lower appellate court and the CCA. This case reminds us of the three mandatory components of a binding plea agreement—(1) a plea of guilty, (2) consideration for the plea, and (3) the trial court’s approval of the plea agreement—without which the trial court cannot order specific performance from either of the parties. The opinion also will be very helpful because it clearly explains that a prosecutor’s promise to do (or not do) something will not create a binding (i.e., enforceable) unilateral contract unless the defendant has performed or otherwise given consideration for that promise.
Finally, this case illustrates the importance of clearly and thoroughly documenting the terms and conditions of plea-bargain agreements, as well as the status of any such agreements, so that an appellate court will have what it needs to effectively review the matter, as occurred here.
Attorney General Opinion
Op. KP-0477 1/22/25
Issue:
Does electronic notice captured by a QR code on a traffic violation card satisfy the notice requirements of Transportation Code §§543.003 and 543.004?
Conclusion:
A court could conclude that providing an alleged traffic violator with a card containing the time and place of appearance and citation number along with a QR code (which serves as an electronic link to access the complete citation for some misdemeanor traffic violations) satisfies the notice requirements of §§543.003 and 543.004 as well as related provisions. Read opinion.
Requested by:
Chair Donna Campbell, Senate Committee on Nominations
Attorney General Opinion Request
RQ-0576-KP 1/22/25
Issue:
Do juvenile criminal case records constitute permanent records under Texas Family Code Chapter 58? Read opinion request.
Requested by:
Gloria Meraz, Texas State Library Archives Commission