Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Ex parte Thomas
No. WR-89,128 3/31/21
Issue:
Must an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction contain factually-supported, case-specific findings to be valid and to give the district court jurisdiction over the case?
Holding:
No. A juvenile transfer order entered after a required transfer hearing and complying with the statutory requirements in Family Code §54.02 is a valid waiver of jurisdiction even if the transfer order does not contain factually-supported, case-specific findings. The Court overrules Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) in concluding that while the types of findings discussed in Moon may be good policy, “the lack of case-specific findings has nothing to do with jurisdiction, fundamental constitutional rights, or even the transfer statute itself.” Read opinion.
Concurrence (Yeary, J.):
“The Court is right to overrule Moon because it was demonstrably wrong about what Section 54.02 of the Texas Family Code requires. (citation omitted) I would not hesitate over the decision to do so on account of the court-made doctrine of stare decisis, which is compelled neither by constitution nor statute.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
For those who have been keeping watch over these cases after Moon was decided, this has been a long time in coming. Moon is about as overruled as a case can get. After thoroughly deconstructing the purported statutory and constitutional bases for Moon, the court asks the question, “So What is Left of Moon?” The court’s one-word response is “Nothing.” Now, of course, you must still follow the statutes in transferring a juvenile to adult criminal district court. But a juvenile transfer order, which is entered after the required transfer hearing and which complies with the statutory requirements, constitutes a valid waiver of jurisdiction, even if the transfer order does not contain factually supported, case-specific findings. A juvenile court may want to continue making case-specific findings because the Thomas court noted that they are “good policy” and are “preferable and helpful.” But they are not required by the statutes or the Constitution. And they do not have to be all of the findings from §54.02(f) (which are not exclusive in any event). And the absence of those specific findings certainly do not subject a juvenile transfer order to attack, assuming that there has otherwise been compliance with the statutes and the Constitution. Great work by the State in this case.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Martinez v. State
Nos. 08-19-00265-CR through -00271-CR 3/31/21
Issue:
Did the trial court correctly allow the State to supplement the jury charge with a definition of the term “reckless” in a cruelty to non-livestock animals case?
Holding:
In seven separate but largely identical opinions (addressing each dog separately), the Court noted error occurred, but supplementing the jury charge with the statutory definition of “recklessly” did not injure or deprive “[the defendant]’s rights or deprive her of a fair and impartial trial.” To defense’s argument that the State proved only criminal negligence, the Court disagreed, concluding “[the defendant] was ‘aware of but consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk’ in failing to provide proper food, water, or shelter” for seven dogs. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This case is a reminder to look over a jury charge closely before it is presented to the jury. The court of appeals also noted that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant acted “knowingly,” which the original jury charge defined. And the evidence was certainly sufficient. If dogs hold a special place in your heart, be warned. Even reading the text of a formal court opinion recounting what happened to these dogs is tragic.
State v. Watson
No. 11-19-00082-CR 3/31/21
Issue:
Can a police officer conduct a protective sweep pursuant to a department policy when he or she finds an unsecured door?
Holding:
No. “[A] protective sweep is permitted only when ‘justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.’” Here, “the officers entered the residence to clear it because the front door became ajar as a result of [the] [o]fficer … knocking on it. The officers did not articulate a belief that someone posing a danger to them was inside of the residence or even a suspicion that a person was inside of the residence.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision is a good summary of the law regarding protective sweeps, as well as consent and standing to challenge a search.
Texas Attorney General Opinion
KP-0364 4/5/21
Issue:
Is a driver’s license required to operate a golf cart on a publicly maintained road under Transportation Code §§551.403 and 551.404?
Conclusion:
Section 521.021 of the Transportation Code prohibits a person, unless expressly exempted, from operating a motor vehicle on a publicly maintained way any part of which is open to the public for vehicular travel unless the person holds a driver’s license. Sections 551.403 and 551.404, which authorize a person to operate a golf cart in certain locations, do not exempt such persons from the driver’s license-holding requirement of §521.021. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The response to this question turns on whether the golf cart constitutes a “motor vehicle” and whether that golf cart is on a “highway.” Both terms are very broadly defined. The opinion also notes that golf carts are exempted from many requirements, but driver’s licensing is not one of the exemptions. Some of the confusion may result from the fact that golf carts are lumped in with bicycles in Chapter 551 of the Transportation Code, while Chapter 551A deals with other off-highway vehicles (for which driver’s licenses are expressly required).
Texas Attorney General Opinion Request
RQ-0402-KP 4/5/21
Issue:
May access to a government facility be conditioned upon obtaining a vaccine, and may a local government enforce this policy under the Governor’s most recent executive order?
Requested by:
James White, State Representative, House District 19
Commentary:
The Governor’s executive order may answer the question posed, and the order also deals with public and private entities that receive public funds. But one suspects that we have not heard the last of this issue.