Texas Courts of Appeals
Havens v. State
No. 13-24-00567-CR 8/20/26
Issue:
In the defendant’s trial for family violence assault by impeding breath or circulation, did the trial judge improperly prevent defense counsel from questioning an expert witness (doctor) about her own experience with domestic violence?
Holding:
No. The judge granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude any mention of history of domestic abuse of the doctor who examined the victim, including by the defense on cross-examination. “Even if we assume without deciding the trial court erred when it prevented defense counsel from cross-examining [the doctor] about her domestic violence experience, we cannot find that [the defendant’s] substantial rights were affected.” The Court noted that the doctor’s testimony was similar to that from an extraneous offense witness who alleged she was similarly assaulted by the defendant. “We cannot find reversible error where [the defendant] was unable to impeach a witness for potential bias because her testimony was cumulative of another unbiased or objective witness.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The doctor in this case was the physician who treated the victim, and the defense sought to elicit testimony about the doctor’s own personal experience on cross-examination. This decision does not give any detail about the defendant’s intended cross-examination. The court of appeals instead held any error in the excluding the testimony was harmless. It would have been helpful if the court of appeals had addressed the merits. Domestic violence prosecutors may still want to review this decision because it also addresses the sufficiency of the evidence and the admissibility of a very similar extraneous offense against another victim.
Cloud v. State
No. 01-24-00395-CR 8/20/26
Issue:
Did the trial judge correctly reject the defendant’s affirmative defense that he voluntarily released two kidnapped victims in a safe place?
Holding:
Yes. Ongoing emotional trauma is a factor in considering whether a kidnapped victim was released in a safe place. Aggravated kidnapping is generally a first-degree offense, but it is a second-degree offense under Penal Code §20.04(d) if the defendant voluntarily releases the victim in a safe place. Because the Penal Code does not define “safe place,” the Court noted that whether a kidnapper released a victim in a safe place is a fact-specific inquiry made on a case-by-case basis. In this case, while the area in which the defendant released the victims (Midtown Houston) was not a high-crime area, the defendant and another masked man had robbed two college-aged women of their cell phones at gunpoint, forced them to get money from an ATM, held them at gunpoint at a motel overnight while waiting to get more money from the ATM, threatened the women if they did not look away while the two men left, and would hurt them and their families if they contacted the authorities afterward. The defendant and his cohort also kept the women’s IDs and told them that they knew where the women lived. While the victims were not physically injured, the Court concluded that their emotional trauma was significant to the “safe place” inquiry. “For a kidnapper to successfully invoke the affirmative defense of safe release, the evidence must show that the release ‘occurred in a place and manner which realistically conveyed’ to his victim that she had been ‘fully released from captivity’ and ‘in circumstances and surroundings wherein aid was readily available’” (citation omitted). … From this, it follows that a factfinding may consider threats that call into question whether a victim is truly free of her captors or entitled to seek aid without fear of their reprisal upon release in evaluating whether the victim was released in a ‘safe place.’” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The “safe-place” determination in a kidnapping case is an affirmative defense, and as such, the burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the place where the victims were left was in fact safe. The court noted that very little evidence was presented on the safeness of the place, both at the guilt/innocence and the punishment stages. The court also placed significant weight on threats made to the victims that the defendant and his cohort knew where their families lived and that they would hurt the victims if they called the police. This is a very fact-bound decision, but it should be helpful in future aggravated kidnapping cases.
Attorney General Opinions
KP-0525 8/26/26
Issue:
May a juvenile probation officer release a child from custody without a detention hearing or send an email to a presiding judge regarding the legality of a prosecutor’s disposition recommendation? And must a juvenile prosecutor disclose such an email under Brady v. Maryland and Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 39.14?
Conclusion:
The Attorney General concluded that a juvenile probation officer who serves as the intake officer or is otherwise considered an authorized officer of the court must release a child from custody under Family Code §53.02(a) if the officer finds that detention is not warranted under §53.02(b), which does not require a hearing or judicial authorization. Hearing requirements under §54.01 do not change when detention results from an alleged violation of probation.
The AG’s Office further wrote that an email from a juvenile probation officer to a judge on the perceived legality of the prosecutor’s disposition recommendation constitutes an improper ex parte communication. Whether that email violates a child’s due process rights or must be disclosed under Brady, however, involves factual questions beyond the scope of an Attorney General opinion. Furthermore, although Art. 39.14(a) does not require a juvenile prosecutor to disclose an email without a discovery request, Art. 39.14(h) would require disclosure if the email tends to negate the defendant’s guilt or reduce his or her punishment. But that determination also implicates fact questions unsuited to an opinion. Read opinion.
Requested by:
Michaela Kee, Bailey County Attorney
KP-0526 8/26/26
Issue:
Can a county adopt a budget for a fiscal year that reduces the funding or staffing for certain law enforcement agencies or reallocate resources of a law enforcement agency without voter approval?
Conclusion:
No. For counties of the required population, Local Gov’t Code §120.002 generally prohibits a county commissioners court from adopting a budget that reduces funding or staffing for law enforcement without voter approval. “Reallocating resources from one constable’s office to another constable precinct would fall under §120.002(a)(2) and require voter approval.” Read opinion.
Requested by:
Joe Gonzales, Bexar County Criminal District Attorney
Attorney General Opinion Requests
RQ-0653-KP 8/26/26
Issue:
May an elected or appointed official who independently maintains records be considered the officer for public information and custodian of records under Texas Gov’t Code §552.201(b) and may the Commissioners Court or County Judge may lawfully require independent officials to route all public information requests through a centralized county office or PIO?
Requested by:
Cheryll A. Jones, Kinney County Auditor