Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Day v. State
No. PD-0955-19 12/16/20
Issue:
Can an officer’s otherwise lawful attempt to detain or arrest a suspect be tainted by an earlier illegality and thereby negate the element of evading arrest that requires a lawful arrest or detention?
Holding:
No. Because the question of a lawful arrest or detention involves an element of the offense of evading, exclusionary rule doctrines do not apply. “Evidentiary exclusionary rules serve a completely different purpose than the evading arrest or detention statute.” Exclusionary rule doctrines that apply to introduction of evidence (including fruit of the poisonous tree, attenuation of the taint, and independent source) “go to the question of whether evidence may be introduced at trial; they do not render otherwise lawful police conduct unlawful.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
If you are having difficulty making sense of this decision, look at it this way. This is a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case, not a search-and-seizure case. The proper test to determine if evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is whether any rational trier of fact (juror) could have found all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. When the defendant in this case fled (evaded), there was a valid warrant for his arrest. From that fact, a rational juror could have found that the attempted arrest or detention was lawful at the time that the defendant fled. The court does not say whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the attempted arrest or detention was unlawful based upon the improperly prolonged detention, but it appears that the answer to that question is “No.” The court notes that, at the time that the defendant fled (evaded), it was undisputed that there was a valid warrant for his arrest.
Diamond v. State
No. PD-1299-18 12/16/20
Issue:
In an opinion on motion for rehearing from its June 10, 2020, opinion, the Court reconsidered the issue: Must the State disclose evidence as material that a laboratory technician—who properly analyzed a defendant’s blood for alcohol content—had been temporarily removed from casework because she had mistakenly certified a blood alcohol analysis report in an unrelated case where a police officer had mislabeled the submission form accompanying a blood sample?
Holding:
No. The Court again ruled that the undisclosed evidence at issue in this case was not material. On rehearing, the Court corrected its analysis to reflect that the defendant’s petition was filed as an Art. 11.09 habeas claim rather than a claim under Art. 11.072. Again, the Court concluded that the lab technician’s analysis and testimony in the defendant’s case was proper and reliable. Her error in the unrelated case had to do with an improper certification of a report rather than her failure to catch a mislabeling of a blood sample. And there was overwhelming and uncontested evidence of the defendant’s intoxication to sustain the defendant’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor DWI. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is a rare case in which the court has issued a new decision after a motion for rehearing, but there is no substantive difference from the original decision. The most important aspect of this case is that it is an appeal from the denial of relief in an application for writ of habeas corpus that is not based upon Article 11.07. Therefore, great deference is given to the trial court’s factual findings (which were thorough in this case). Another important aspect of this case is that it is decided under Brady v. Maryland, not the Michael Morton Act (which is not mentioned). The trial court’s factual findings and the overwhelming evidence in support of the defendant’s guilt made it clear that the alleged Brady evidence in this case was not “material” (and therefore not Brady evidence).
Texas Courts of Appeals
State v. Baldwin
No. 14-19-00154-CR 12/10/20
Issue:
Did an affidavit for a search warrant establish sufficient probable cause to search the contents of a cellphone belonging to the defendant, suspected in a home invasion robbery–murder?
Holding (en banc):
No. The affidavit did not contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause that a search of the defendant’s cellphone was likely to produce evidence in the murder investigation. The court noted that typically, an affidavit in support of a warrant to search a cellphone’s contents must include facts that a cellphone was used shortly before, during, or shortly after the crime. “In this case, the nexus between the vehicle that Baldwin was driving and the vehicle seen at the crime is tenuous at best. Extending that nexus to include Baldwin’s cellphone based on nothing more than a recitation that it is common for people to communicate their plans via text messaging, phone calls, or other communication applications would be extending the reach of probable cause too far.” Read opinion.
Concurrence (Zimmerer, J.):
“I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no nexus between Baldwin’s vehicle and the offense. Because I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the search warrant affidavit did not establish a nexus between criminal activity and the cellphone I concur in the court’s judgment.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Christopher, J., Frost, C.J., Wise and Jewell, JJ. joining):
“Broadly speaking, there are two errors with the majority’s analysis. First, there is no adherence to the standard of review. The majority has simply supplanted its own judgment for that of the magistrate. And second, there is no adherence to the standard for probable cause. Rather than apply the flexible and non-demanding standard that the law requires, the majority has imposed a rigid and unrealistic standard that will undo all of the dutiful efforts of law enforcement to obtain a search warrant through the proper channels.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Just a couple of weeks ago, the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Foreman v. State that a magistrate could infer from the articulated facts in a warrant to search a custom auto business that the business would have surveillance video. As was the case in Foreman, this appears to be a “close case.” Because this is an en banc decision on a nine-member court and there are also four dissenting justices, you could very well expect review of this case by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Add to that the cell-phone subject matter, and I really, really want the Court of Criminal Appeals to review this decision.
State v. Brent
No. 01-19-01008-CR 12/10/20
Issue:
Was the defendant entitled to judicial clemency under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 42A.701 more than 30 days after entry of the trial court’s order discharging the defendant from community supervision?
Holding:
Yes. Art. 42A.701 gives trial courts the discretion to grant judicial clemency at any time after the defendant is discharged from community supervision under that statute. The Court rejected the State’s argument that Art. 42A.701 does not apply to “natural” discharges of community supervision, when the period of supervision ends before the defendant fulfills all the terms and conditions. The Court concluded that Art. 42A.701 broadly applies to any offense for which a defendant has been sentenced to community supervision, other than those offenses expressly exempted by the statute. Read opinion.
Commentary:
It would seem inevitable that this decision will be reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals because the court of appeals acknowledged that it was issuing a holding different from five other courts of appeals that had addressed the same issue. If this decision holds up, a trial judge can issue judicial clemency over two years after a defendant’s probation was early-terminated—as was the situation in this case—or even longer.
Roland v. State
No. 01-19-00752-CR 12/15/20
Issue:
Do district courts and county courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses involving official misconduct?
Holding:
No. Only district courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors involving official misconduct. Under CCP Art. 4.05 and Government Code §26.045(a), neither “the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the Government Code grants original jurisdiction over misdemeanors involving official misconduct to county courts at law.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
If your trial judge is wondering why you are filing a misdemeanor-involving official misconduct in district court, show him this decision.
Holloway v. State
No. 10-18-00053-CR 12/9/20
Issue:
For purposes of a jury charge, is the offense of endangering a child a “nature of conduct” offense?
Holding:
No. Endangering a child is a “result of conduct” offense, so the mental state in a jury charge should be tailored to the result of the defendant’s conduct. In this case, the defendant was charged under §22.041(c) (placing a child under 15 in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental impairment), and all four of the culpable mental states were properly included in the application paragraph. Although the abstract portion of the jury charge improperly included definitions of culpable mental state using language regarding only the nature of conduct and circumstances surrounding the conduct, the Court found the error harmless. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The court of appeals notes that there is a split of authority among the other courts of appeals regarding this issue. Stay tuned to see if the Court of Criminal Appeals will review this decision. Hopefully, that will occur, because the bench and bar are far too often confused about whether the culpable mental state for an offense is based upon the “result of the conduct,” “nature of the conduct,” or “circumstances surrounding the conduct.”
Texas Attorney General Opinions
No. KP-0345 12/17/20
Issue:
What county officers have authority to remove a county auditor?
Conclusion:
A court would likely conclude that removal of a county auditor is solely at the discretion of the district judges. A party to a removal action, however, may appeal the final judgment to the court of appeals under Local Gov’t Code §87.019. While Local Gov’t Code §84.009 does not establish an administrative procedure to appeal the district judges’ decision, the statute does not foreclose the possibility of court review under certain circumstances, such as a mandamus action for abuse of discretion. A court would also likely conclude that a county auditor is entitled to written notice of possible removal and a forum to be heard by those conducting fact-finding into the allegation underlying the removal. Read opinion.
Last Case Summary email for the year
This is the last issue of TDCAA’s Weekly Case Summaries for 2020. Case Summaries will return on Jan. 8, 2020. Thank you for your readership. All of us at TDCAA wish you all a joyful holiday season and a very happy 2021. (And honestly, isn’t it bound to be better than 2020 has been??)
CCP changes for January 2021
As part of its code reorganization efforts, the Texas Legislature passed a bill (HB 4173) in 2019 that makes non-substantive changes to chapters in the Code of Criminal Procedure affecting protective orders, grand juries, and victims’ rights. Those changes take effect on January 1, 2021, and the crack staff in our publications department (read: one very busy Diane Beckham!) has laid out those new chapters, along with source and disposition charts, as PDFs that you can download for free at https://www.tdcaa.com/books/ (look for the links along the right-hand “rail” of your desktop layout). These changes will also be incorporated into the upcoming 2021 edition of TDCAA’s code books, which will be available next summer following the 87th Regular Session, but to bridge the gap until then, please take advantage of these free resources and share them with others in your courthouse as needed.
TDCAA is pleased to offer these unique case summaries from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court, the Texas Courts of Appeals and the Texas Attorney General. In addition to the basic summaries, each case will have a link to the full text opinion and will offer exclusive prosecutor commentary explaining how the case may impact you as a prosecutor. The case summaries are for the benefit of prosecutors, their staff members, and members of the law enforcement community. These summaries are NOT a source of legal advice for citizens. The commentaries expressed in these case summaries are not official statements by TDCAA and do not represent the opinions of TDCAA, its staff, or any member of the association. Please email comments, problems, or questions to Diane Beckham.