United States Supreme Court
Hemphill v. New York
No. 20-637 1/20/22
Issue:
Did the trial court’s admission of parts of a plea allocution transcript of an unavailable witness over the defendant’s objection violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation?
Holding:
Yes. To test the reliability and veracity of the evidence presented against a defendant, the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant be able to confront and cross-examine the witness. Although states are permitted to adopt reasonable procedural rules governing the exercise of a defendant’s right to confrontation, the Court held that the “door-opening” principle, which allows a trial court to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible, did not “open the door to violations of constitutional requirements merely by making evidence relevant to contradict their defense.” There is no exception that allows a trial judge to decide if unconfronted testimonial hearsay might be reasonably necessary to correct misleading impressions. Read opinion.
Concurrence (Alito, J. joined by Kavanaugh, J.):
The Court does not include the common law rule of completeness in its decision. “When a defendant introduces the statement of an unavailable declarant on a given subject, he commits himself to the trier of fact’s examination of what the declarant has to say on that subject. The remainder of the declarant’s statement or statements—and any other statements by the same declarant on the same subject—are fair game.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Thomas, J.):
Because the defendant here did not raise his Sixth Amendment claim in the court of appeals, the dissent concluded the Court lacked jurisdiction to review that court’s decision. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This holding would apply to false impression situations, as well as opening the door. As noted at the end of Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion, the Court is not deciding whether the Confrontation Clause would defeat the applicability of the rule of optional completeness, and as suggested by Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, that issue might be decided differently from this case. In the meantime, in a future case, if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence to which the State cannot respond because of the defendant’s confrontation rights, the majority opinion allows the trial judge to exclude the defendant’s evidence as misleading under Rule 403. If the judge does not realize the misleading nature of the defendant’s evidence until after it is admitted, the majority also notes that the judge could strike that evidence under Rule 105.
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Witcher v. State
No. PD-0034-21 1/26/22
Issue:
Was evidence sufficient to support the “30 or more days” element of the continuous sexual abuse offense when a definite ending date was established but a start date was not?
Holding:
Yes. Although a jury may not come to conclusions based on mere speculation, it may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. Here, testimony from the victim, the victim’s sister, and an investigator established the abuse started around the time the victim’s brother went to jail, which was on June 10, 2018. Although the testimony included references to “give or take” and “around that time,” given the context, the jury could have rationally inferred when the abuse occurred. Read opinion.
Dissent (Keel, J. joined by Richardson, Walker, and McClure, JJ.):
Because the testimony regarding the start of the abuse was not definitive and the strict nature of the 30-day timeframe in Tex. Penal Code §21.02(b)(1), the jury had to speculate as to a start date. “[S]peculation will not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The analyses in both the majority and dissenting opinions are very short. If the State is faced with a close issue, as was apparently the situation in this case, the prosecutor should endeavor to put on as much evidence as possible on the disputed issue. Otherwise, the appellate court might hold that the jury found in favor of the State on the disputed issue based on nothing more than speculation, as opposed to inference.
State v. Garcia
No. PD-0183-21 1/26/22
Issue:
Can the State appeal a trial court’s order that grants post-conviction habeas corpus relief and vacates the conviction in a misdemeanor case?
Holding:
Yes. By granting habeas corpus relief and vacating the misdemeanor conviction, the trial court effectively granted the defendant a new trial regardless of whether the trial court also ordered that the defendant be discharged from custody. As a result, under these circumstances, the State is entitled to appeal a trial court’s order granting habeas relief that results in a new trial under CCP Art. 44.01(a)(3). Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision may be of interest to appellate prosecutors only. As such, the decision is very much in line with prior decisions of the court on similar issues. One does not look at the title of a defendant’s pleading to decide whether the State can appeal. One looks at the effect of granting relief to the defendant on that pleading. This case is helpful and unique in that it rejected the very limiting construction that the court of appeals had placed upon the controlling statute—Art. 44.01—because of Art. 44.01(k), which permits appeals from the granting of relief under Art. 11.072.
Rubio v. State
No. PD-0234-20 1/26/22
Issue:
Does Rule 21.4(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure allow a defendant to file an amended motion for new trial, even after the trial court has denied his initial motion for a new trial?
Holding:
Yes. Because the language of the rule does not explicitly preclude a defendant from filing an amended motion for new trial after his initial motion is overruled, a defendant is permitted to do so as long as he obtains leave of court and is within the original 30-day time period from the date of the judgment and sentence. Read opinion.
Dissent (Keller, P.J., joined by Hervey and Keel, JJ.):
Although the rule “does not explicitly preclude” a defendant from obtaining leave from the court to file an amended motion for a new trial after the court has already overruled his initial new trial motion, “I would hesitate to hold that a rule’s silence … amounts to permission.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The odds are pretty low for a trial court to rule on and deny a defendant’s initial motion for new trial so quickly that the defendant still has time to file an amended motion for new trial within the 30-day time period. But it happened in this case. If a defendant attempts to do so in a future case, the prosecutor should make sure the defendant has requested leave of the trial court to file the amended motion for new trial and perhaps even suggest to the court that it is not required to grant that leave.
Pugh v. State
No. PD-1053-19 1/26/22
Issue:
Can computer-generated animations illustrating an accident reconstruction expert’s testimony depicting human behavior be admitted as a demonstrative exhibit?
Holding:
Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that a trial court may admit a computer-generated animation as a demonstrative exhibit showing otherwise admitted testimony or evidence so long as it: 1) is authenticated, 2) is relevant, and 3) has probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Read opinion.
Concurrence (Walker, J.):
Because of the powerful impact of computer-generated animations, when the State uses them, appointed defense counsel should seek expert assistance and funds to hire an expert. If funds are not available, Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence may need to balance out the playing field. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision is now the leading decision on the admissibility of computer-generated animations. It is extremely lengthy and thorough. The legal analysis begins on page 22 of the opinion and continues until page 56, and every bit of it is important, whether it is explaining prior decisions on the issue or painstakingly presenting each step that must be followed in admitting the evidence. Prosecutors should read this decision if they wish to admit computer-generated animations (or object to the defense attempt to introduce it). As noted by Judge Newell’s opinion for the court, even more special care should be undertaken in those computer animations that include depictions of human behavior. The last few pages of the opinion deal with the appropriate limiting instruction that should be given if one is requested.
Ex Parte Matthews
No. WR-91,731-01 1/26/22
Issue:
Should the requirements for the inference of falsity (that misconduct tainted the individual case) in Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) apply in cases involving a police officer with a demonstrated pattern of misconduct in drug-related cases?
Holding:
Yes. The Court concluded the considerations that drove its decision to require five factors to achieve an inference of falsity, or bad evidence in the particular defendant’s case, were the same in cases involving police officers who display a pattern of misconduct in drug-related cases as those involving lab technicians who routinely falsify lab tests and documentation. To be granted relief, a defendant must prove five requirements have been met including: 1) the police officer in question was a State actor; 2) the officer committed multiple instances of intentional misconduct in another case or cases; 3) this officer was the same officer who worked on the defendant’s case; 4) the misconduct was the type that would have affected the evidence in the defendant’s case; and 5) the officer handled and processed the evidence in the defendant’s case within roughly the same period of time as the other misconduct. In addition, the defendant has the burden to prove materiality. Read opinion.
Commentary:
All parties, including the State Prosecuting Attorney, agreed that Ex parte Coty should be extended to include law enforcement officers. This decision will be of use only to prosecutors who handle post-conviction writs of habeas corpus (and perhaps conviction integrity review), but it is a very significant decision.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Hall v. State
No. 14-19-00902-CR 1/20/22
Issue:
Did a trial court correctly allow the State to reopen its case-in-chief to present testimony from a rebuttal witness (a criminal court judge and friend of the victim) to testify about the safety of the area where the murder took place?
Holding:
Yes. The court held the judge’s testimony did not significantly add to the evidence in a way that would have a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the verdict, because the judge’s testimony was brief, based on his familiarity with the area for over 20 years, and was offered to rebut the self-defense theory that the area was dangerous. Read opinion.
Concurrence (Hassan, J.):
“[T]he judge was testifying as a quasi-expert—he had no direct knowledge of the facts underlying the criminal charge but had practiced for 20-plus years near the post office where the altercation happened and visited it twice a month. … Because the testifying judge had no unique knowledge concerning the facts of the case itself, allowing him to testify as a judge was an abuse of discretion. But Appellant did not specifically object to the witness identifying himself as a judge; therefore, the relevant issue on appeal was not preserved.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The majority opinion deals with the propriety of reopening the case to allow for rebuttal testimony and calling a judge as the witness to present that rebuttal testimony. However, the decision may only have limited value on the merits because much of the legal analysis of the majority opinion reads like a harm analysis, as opposed to a decision on the merits.