Texas Supreme Court
Matzen v. McLane
No. 20-0523 12/17/21
Issue:
Did the court of appeals correctly deny the State’s plea to the jurisdiction for two of the defendant’s claims (Due Process and Takings Clause violations) arising from his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP)?
Holding:
No. The defendant has the burden to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate that state officials are engaged in ultra vires conduct or that sovereign immunity from suit has been waived or does not apply. The Court concluded in the interlocutory appeal that the defendant had not met this burden in this case. As for his Due Process claim, the Constitution does not entitle a defendant to an individualized hearing regarding the amount he is charged for civil commitment cost recovery fees. As the Court concluded in In re State, 556 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. 2018), an SVP’s due-process rights are adequately protected by the notice and hearing requirements mandated by the Legislature in the amendments to the SVP Act. The defendant, in this case, received notice and a hearing with his original commitment order and was given another individualized hearing when his commitment was amended to conform to the legislative changes. As for his Takings Clause violation claim, the court of appeals concluded there was a possibility of a takings claim in the defendant’s pleadings because it could not determine whether the costs charged to the defendant exceeded the government’s costs for his commitment. However, this analysis impermissibly shifted the defendant’s burden to affirmatively state a viable claim. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The Court’s opinion referred to the defendant’s (SVP’s) claims as “idiosyncratic” and not “cognizable.” In this context, this means that the defendant’s claims were “clearly wrong.” This decision should settle these issues once and for all, so turn to the decision in one of those rare instances in which a civil due-process or due-course-of-law claim has been made or a civil takings claim has been made.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Sopko v. State
No. 02-20-00162-CR 12/16/21
Issue:
Did the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for discovery at his probation revocation hearing deprive him of his discovery rights under Article 39.14 in light of Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)?
Holding:
Without deciding whether 1) video evidence and a written statement by the victim were material, 2) the trial court incorrectly denied the defendant’s motion for discovery, or 3) that any Article 39.14 error implicated a substantial right, the court concluded the defendant was not harmed. The State had provided the video and written statement to the defendant before he pleaded guilty to the underlying offense, the video evidence went “viral” so the defendant had access to it, because of the standing discovery order the defendant should have made a discovery request to the State, and it was clear that his sentence was based on his inability to complete probation. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is not really a decision about the Michael Morton Act or even Watkins. This is a decision solely about the appropriate harm analysis. The defendant was alleging a violation of the Michael Morton Act—a statutory violation. Thus, the appropriate harm analysis is under Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, not the harm analysis for a constitutional violation under Brady v. Maryland. In addition to the fact that the defendant had ample access to the evidence that was initially not disclosed, the court notes that the defendant also was not harmed because he could have requested a continuance if he needed more time to prepare for the hearing. Refer to this decision if a trial judge (or an appellate court) wants to take a drastic remedy for a delay in discovery.
Null v. State
No. 14-19-00839-CR 12/16/21
Issue:
Did the trial court correctly admit DNA evidence related to an extraneous assault at the punishment phase?
Holding:
No. Withdrawing its earlier opinion, the en banc court reversed the defendant’s judgment as to punishment because the record did not contain any evidence showing that the external lab properly applied applicable scientific techniques to the DNA evidence. Because of this, the State was unable to establish reliability as required by Rule 702, and the evidence was inadmissible. Read opinion.
Dissent (Christopher, C.J., joined by Wise, Jewell, and Wilson, J.J.):
The question for this court is whether the State’s DNA evidence was actually scientifically reliable and because it was, the court should overrule the defendant’s reliability complaint. There was uncontroverted evidence that the external lab correctly performed the DNA analysis, and the trial court was permitted to take judicial notice of DNA testing and STR (short tandem repeats) testing because these tests have already been widely accepted by other courts. Read opinion.
Commentary:
If this decision is really about the reliability of DNA evidence, then it should be reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals—and reversed. As noted by the dissent, reliability of DNA evidence is not a difficult issue. When reading the actual analysis of the majority opinion, it talks about the State’s witness not having “personal knowledge” of what was done by other analysts. This type of language is typically seen in Confrontation-Clause claims, which was not before the court in this case. Expect this decision to be reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, and a preservation claim raised by the State may get a review by the high court as well.
State v. Torres
Nos. 13-20-00101-CR & -00102-CR 12/21/21
Issue:
Did the trial court correctly grant a juvenile’s motion to suppress a recorded oral statement he made to police when it did not comply with Tex. Fam. Code §51.095(f)?
Holding:
Yes. If a magistrate requests the ability to review a juvenile’s statement to determine whether it was given voluntarily, the statement is inadmissible if the magistrate does not affirmatively find that the statement was voluntary. Here, the record did not indicate that the defendant’s statement was involuntary; however, because the magistrate invoked §51.095’s procedures, the magistrate was also required to make a voluntariness determination. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The court treated this case as one of first impression—the first one to deal with a situation in which §51.095(f)’s procedures were used. In that respect, this decision is one of pure statutory construction. A prosecutor should always be careful to read all of the applicable statutory provisions related to an issue that is before the court. That is especially true when dealing with the admissibility of juvenile statements. This is a significant decision and should be read by all juvenile prosecutors.
Vitela v. State
Nos. 04-19-00737-CR & -00738-CR 12/22
Issue:
Did the trial court correctly deny the defendant’s motion to suppress black box evidence found in his totaled car at an impound lot?
Holding:
Yes. The court held the defendant lacked standing to challenge the black box evidence retrieved from his totaled car because he abandoned his car. There was no evidence showing he tried to collect the car or that he communicated to anyone about whether he planned to collect it. Therefore, he did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in his car and did not have standing to challenge the evidence that officers collected. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The defendant’s car had been “totaled” by the crash, and when the police obtained evidence from the car, it was in the process of being sold by an insurance company. The defendant clearly abandoned the car and could not complain about the State’s collection of the black box. The decision also deals with the reliability of “black box” expert testimony and the sufficiency of the evidence-based—in part—upon the readings from the black box. Read this decision before handling vehicular crimes cases.
Daniel v. State
No. 03-20-00519-CR 12/23/21
Issue:
Does a police officer have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop if he only views a driver’s vehicle cross a roadway’s dotted white lines but does so when no other cars are near his vehicle?
Holding:
No. Because Subsections (1) and (2) are joined by the conjunctive “and,” to violate Transportation Code §545.060(a), a motorist must both fail to drive as nearly as practical within a single lane and fail to make that movement safely. Read opinion.
Dissent (Goodwin, J.):
Section 545.060(a) sets forth two “violations, rather than two requirements. When two requirements are joined by the conjunctive ‘and,’ the violation of either requirement constitutes a violation of the statutory provision.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The Court of Criminal Appeals already has before it the issue of whether to adopt the 2016 plurality opinion in Leming v. State, rejected by the court of appeals in this case. Until then, be aware of this decision and all of the others that have addressed this issue, which is purely one of statutory construction.