Texas Courts of Appeals
Washington v. State
No. 14-26-00020-CR 7/14/26
Issue:
Did the trial court impermissibly fail to consider the available range of punishment after a probation revocation?
Holding:
Yes. The Court concluded that the judge imposed a predetermined sentence of five years based on a previous plea bargain in the case rather than considering the full punishment range of two to five years. At the close of evidence in the revocation hearing, the judge told the defendant, “When you agreed to a straight probation deal, I’ve already assessed your punishment at [the maximum of] five years,” and, “If you violate, if you go to a contested hearing and I find that there is a violation, it’s five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections because that’s actually the deal that you signed up for back in 2021.” The Court concluded that while the first statement was insufficient to show the judge failed to consider the full range of punishment, the second statement was “more concerning. In it, the judge appears to be telling [the defendant] that when the judge finds a violation of the terms of a defendant’s community supervision, the judge will give that defendant the sentence that was agreed to in the original plea bargain. This clearly suggests the judge was confining himself to the original agreed-to sentence and not considering the entire available range of punishment as required by due process.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
An appellate court will presume that a trial judge acted fairly and impartially, including by considering the full range of punishment, without clear evidence to the contrary. When a trial judge makes comments like those in this case, there is usually little that a prosecutor can do to ameliorate the situation. However, if this scenario occurs, it’s certainly worth a try to ask the trial judge respectfully, but directly, on the record if he or she has determined the defendant’s sentence after consideration of the full range of punishment. Perhaps something to the effect of, “Your Honor, just so the record is clear, you’ve decided to assess the defendant’s sentence at five years after consideration of the full range of punishment, right?”
State v. Hines
No. 08-25-00301-CR 7/23/26
Issue:
Did the trial court properly dismiss an indictment with prejudice against the defendant for sexual abuse of a child after the State filed and dismissed five indictments arising from the same set of facts over a three-year period?
Holding:
Yes. The Court held that under the speedy trial factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, the “record demonstrates a continuing course of deliberate conduct by the State to delay the litigation until it felt comfortable in going to trial on charges it never seemed able to indict properly.” The prior district attorney dismissed four indictments all based on the same set of facts, contending that he had not had time to prepare for trial, that he needed to go out of state to interview a witness, and that he needed to “reanalyze” the second indictment. The State, under a new district attorney, obtained the fifth indictment at an emergency grand jury session to make sure the indictment was timely. “By itself, [the former district attorney’s] admission that the third and fourth indictments were based upon the same evidence as the second, and that no further investigation of the case was undertaken, demonstrates how the State’s action in filing and dismissing indictments to avoid trial settings when [the defendant] announced ready was prejudicial to the defense.” The Court concluded that the State had failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice by demonstrating that the defense was unimpaired by the delay, and the remaining Barker factors “all lie against the State.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Repeatedly dismissing a case and refiling it later—based on essentially the same facts, evidence, and investigatory efforts—is not acceptable as a means to circumvent discovery, trial obligations, and deadlines, or to allow more time to prepare for trial, even if the State does not act with conscious bad faith. Though the facts of this case are uncommon, let this opinion serve as a warning of what can happen if the record demonstrates a lack of reasonable diligence by the State in pursuing a timely prosecution. No one wants an appellate opinion in which the terms “negligence and sloth” have been used in relation to carrying out prosecutorial duties.