U.S. Supreme Court
Torres v. Madrid, et al.
No. 19-292 3/25/21
Issue:
Does application of physical force to a person with intent to restrain considered a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued?
Holding:
Yes. While force itself does not alone satisfy the definition of a seizure, use of force with an intent to restraint can be considered a seizure. In this case, the officers shot at the defendant when she fled in her car after they approached her. The Court rejected the government’s arguments that: (1) all seizures should be evaluated under one test: intentional acquisition of control, and (2) because officers shot the defendant, rather than restrained her with more conventional means (such as with their hands), no seizure had occurred. “We will not carve out this greater intrusion on personal security from the mere-touch rule just because founding-era courts did not confront apprehension by firearm.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Gorsuch, J.; Thomas and Alito, J.J. joining):
“The majority holds that a criminal suspect can be simultaneously seized and roaming at large. On the majority’s account, a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ takes place whenever an officer ‘merely touches’ a suspect. It’s a seizure even if the suspect refuses to stop, evades capture, and rides off into the sunset never to be seen again. That view is as mistaken as it is novel.”
Commentary:
If dueling Supreme Court opinions are like boxing matches then this is Rocky. Primary cases are the jabs, cutting commentary the knock-down blows. At the end, both fighters are beaten bloody, and the Chief Justice wins the split decision. This case is difficult for most prosecutors because the constitutional issues in play are based in liability for harm rather than legality of obtaining evidence. The Court’s holding will have repercussions in criminal law because evidence is often dropped or discarded in the course of what would generally be described as “unsuccessful” arrests, i.e. the suspect was not immediately apprehended. After Hodari D., most of these cases were resolved in favor of law enforcement. Now, even if the suspect escapes, the situation may still be deemed a seizure, and evidence recovered at the scene might be attributable to that seizure. Both sides spend much time discussing Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Hodari D. One clear takeaway is that Justice Gorsuch has assumed Justice Scalia’s mantle as the Court’s “King of Sting” in dissent.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Busbee v. State
No. 03-19-00584-CR 3/17/21
Issue:
Is a prior conviction for stalking admissible during the guilt/innocence phase of trial as an element of the charged offense when it is charged as a second-degree felony under Penal Code §42.072?
Holding:
Undecided. The court looked to other prior-conviction provisions in the DWI and Evading Arrest statutes to determine whether the defendant’s prior conviction for stalking was admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of trial. In doing so, the Court pointed out there are two conflicting opinions by the Court of Criminal Appeals: 1) Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518, 520–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) and 2) Calton v. State, 176 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In Oliva, the Court held a prior conviction for DWI was admissible only during the punishment phase, whereas in Calton, the Court held that a prior conviction for evading arrest was admissible during the guilt/innocence phase. The Court ultimately avoided addressing the prior conviction question, and instead held that regardless of whether the defendant’s prior conviction should have been admitted during guilt/innocence, the defendant was not harmed by the admission of his prior stalking conviction. Read opinion.
State v. Mendez
No. 05-20-00307-CR 3/23/21
Issue:
Under CCP Article 18.07, is there a deadline by which a blood sample seized under a warrant must be tested and analyzed?
Holding:
No. While the blood must be seized within three days, it need not be tested and analyzed in the three-day period mentioned in Article 18.07(a)(3). Execution of the warrant under Article 18.07 refers to the blood draw itself, “not the subsequent testing and analysis.” As a result, the court reversed the motion to suppress and remanded the case. Read opinion.
Roman-Rodriguez v. State
No. 11-19-00091-CR 3/18/21
Issue:
Under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.07, §3(a), was the defendant entitled to introduce evidence of his federal immigration detention following his arrest for a drug offense to assist the jury in assessing his punishment?
Holding:
No. “If the trial court had admitted the evidence that [the defendant] had been detained by ICE, an explanation of why [he] had been detained would likely have led to the disclosure of his immigration status—a matter that is fraught with risk.” Citing Rule 403 and Frank v. State, 992 S.W.2d 756, 757–58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d), the Court concluded that introduction of the evidence would have caused the jury to learn of the defendant’s undocumented status and would have “injected references to federal immigration laws and their attendant issues into the jury’s determination of a proper punishment for [the defendant’s] state-based drug conviction.” Read opinion.
Prosecutor Scholarships for Conference on Crimes Against Women
Through the Texas Bar Foundation, scholarships are available for Texas prosecutors from under-resourced and primarily rural counties to attend the 2021 virtual Conference on Crimes Against Women (CCAW), presented May 17-19 and 24-26. The CCAW is a national clearinghouse of best practices for law enforcement, prosecuting attorneys, advocates, and others who work in the area of crimes against women. For more about the conference, visit www.ConferenceCAW.org. To apply for a scholarship, click here.