Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Garcia v. State
No. PD-0025-21 3/2/22
Issue:
Was a defendant required to object to a restitution order at trial to preserve his challenge to the order?
Holding:
Yes. Restitution order challenges must be raised in the trial court to preserve them for appellate review. The Court acknowledged its previous decision, Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022), determining that a “factual-basis complaint” does not need to be preserved but a challenge to the propriety of the order does. However, the Idowu court did not distinguish between what constituted a factual basis and a proprietary basis. Therefore, the Court abandoned this distinction and held that in the context of a restitution order, a defendant forfeits his right to an appeal for failing to object in the trial court. Read opinion.
Dissent (Yeary, J.):
Rather than address this case on the merits, the Court should remand to the court of appeals to address the procedural default question and allow the parties to brief the court on the difference between “appropriateness” claims and “factual basis” claims under Idowu. Read opinion.
Commentary:
A “factual basis” challenge to a restitution order protests the amount of restitution ordered, whereas a “propriety” challenge to a restitution order contests whether restitution may be ordered at all. With this opinion, it is now clear that regardless of which of these challenges (or both) a defendant wishes to pursue, the defendant must object in the trial court to preserve error. Though error-preservation cases are often noteworthy only to appellate practitioners, trial prosecutors should know the difference between these two types of potential challenges to a restitution order so that they can prepare to offer evidence to support the order, generally, and the particular amount, specifically, and ensure that victims are as paid as the law allows.
Texas Courts of Appeals
State v. Curipoma
No. 03-22-00032-CR 2/25/22
Issue:
When a defendant files a habeas application in a district court (Travis County) not in the same county where the County Attorney charged him (Kinney County), can that County Attorney serve as the attorney for the State in the habeas proceeding?
Holding:
No. Because the defendant was permitted to challenge his constructive confinement in Kinney County on a misdemeanor criminal-trespass charge in a district court in Travis County, the appropriate representative for the State was the Travis County District Attorney. The Court reasoned that although CCP Art. 11.09 allows defendants charged with misdemeanors to apply for habeas corpus relief in a county court, the defendant is not required to file there. The defendant instead may file in a district court because according to Tex. Const. Art. V, §8, as long as there is no other provision granting exclusive jurisdiction to a county court, a district court has “plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor actions.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Although a defendant usually will file a CCP Art. 11.09 application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county court where the defendant’s misdemeanor case (which creates the “confinement” that the defendant seeks relief from) is filed, he or she does not have to. If the defendant chooses to file an Art. 11.09 habeas corpus application in a county other than the county where the case is filed, the proper representative for the State of Texas in the habeas corpus proceeding is the prosecuting authority in the county where the application is filed, not the prosecuting authority in the county where the case is filed.
Null v. State
No. 14-19-00839-CR 2/24/22
Issue:
Did a trial court correctly overrule a defendant’s Rule 702 objection to a lab expert’s testimony and evidence about an external lab’s testing of DNA evidence in the case?
Holding:
No. The court, on en banc reconsideration, held the evidence did not establish that the external lab’s DNA testing and analysis were conducted using proper scientific techniques. Here, the lab expert did not know who completed the four-step DNA testing process, whether internal protocols were followed, and if the testing instruments were calibrated. As a result, the evidence was improperly admitted. In addition, the majority disagreed that the trial court could have taken judicial notice that DNA analysis has been widely accepted because it would have resulted in a “denial of clearly established constitutional protections.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Christopher, C.J. joined by Wise, Jewell, and Wilson, J.J.):
“[T]here is nothing even remotely extraordinary about recognizing the validity [of DNA analysis].” Therefore, there were no conflicts or extraordinary circumstances that warranted en banc consideration. Read opinion.
Commentary:
It is very likely that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals will review (and probably reverse) this decision. The opinion appears to conflict with the CCA’s recent decision in Molina v. State, 632 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), and with at least one other intermediate appellate court. Further, the opinion seems to misapply the CCA’s prior precedent in Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), and impose a requirement that, for DNA comparison testimony to be admissible, the expert who testifies about his or her independent conclusions regarding DNA comparison between “known” and “unknown” DNA profiles must be employed by the laboratory where the “unknown” DNA profile was generated, or else the other person or persons who performed the laboratory work to generate the “unknown” DNA profile must also testify.
Ex Parte Pham
No. 14-20-00872-CR 3/1/22
Issue:
Is a defendant’s plea knowing and voluntary if he does not receive an admonishment that his plea could result in the inability to reinstate his professional license?
Holding:
Yes. Because the defendant decided to proceed pro se in his case, he was responsible for understanding the consequences of his plea and that a “no contest” plea was the functional equivalent of a “guilty” plea. Additionally, a trial court is required to admonish a defendant only about punitive consequences or others that are “specifically enunciated in the law.” Here, the defendant did not cite to any authority that requires an admonishment about professional licenses. Read opinion.
Commentary:
It is very important that a trial judge conducts a thorough Faretta hearing and fully advises a defendant of the potential pitfalls of proceeding pro se. However, once the court conducts the Faretta hearing and grants the defendant’s motion for self-representation, the defendant is on his or her own and is responsible for learning, understanding, and correctly applying all rules of evidence, rules of procedure, and substantive law that pertain to the defendant’s case. A defendant who fails to do so cannot later complain about misunderstanding the law or its consequences, or about any mistakes made during his or her self-representation.
Hinton Memorial Scholarship Reminder
Want to go to the 2022 TDCAA Annual Criminal and Civil Law Conference but don’t have the funds? Just a reminder that the Foundation, through generous gifts in memory of Mike Hinton, can provide you with a scholarship! All you need to do is fill out the application HERE and send it in. Questions? Just call Rob at 512/971-8425. But hurry, applications are due April 30.