Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Petetan v. State
No. AP-77,038 5/12/21
Issue:
Was the evidence supporting the jury’s rejection of the defendant’s intellectual disability claim factually sufficient?
Holding:
No. In applying the Supreme Court’s framework from the Hall and Moore decisions, the Court held the evidence was factually sufficient to support a finding of the defendant’s intellectual disability. Additionally, the Court held that “emphasizing [the defendant’s] adaptive strengths to undermine reliance upon an expert diagnosis repeats the problem identified by the Supreme Court in Moore I and Moore II. … We cannot hold the evidence supporting the adverse finding factually sufficient because there was no competing medical evidence. Had there been, we might be assured that the jury’s rejection of the evidence of intellectual disability did not run afoul of Supreme Court precedent. After Moore I and Moore II, a factfinder cannot substitute its opinion for that of all of the examining doctors.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Keller, P.J. joined by Yeary, Keel, and Slaughter, JJ.):
Presiding Judge Keller argued the jury had a “manifestly reasonable response to the evidence” when it rejected the defendant’s intellectual disability claim because “all of the medical evidence suggesting intellectual disability in this case is flawed and … the non-medical evidence is … from biased and unreliable sources. And most of all … [there was] evidence of pervasive malingering, deception, and fakery by this defendant.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
There are two takeaways from this important case: 1. The trial jury determines whether the defendant is intellectually disabled in a death-penalty case. This decision puts to rest any notion that a trial judge makes the determination prior to trial, at least in the absence of a statute on point; 2. If the defendant has experts who will say he is intellectually disabled, the prosecution almost certainly needs experts who will say he is not intellectually disabled if they hope to win the issues on appeal.
Montelongo v. State
No. PD-0202-19 5/12/21
Issue:
After a trial court sua sponte cancels a defendant’s hearing on a motion for new trial without rescheduling, must the defendant object to the cancelation or attempt to reschedule to preserve his issue for appeal?
Holding:
No. “[B]y timely filing and presenting a motion for new trial requesting a hearing … [the defendant] preserved the issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to hold the hearing for appeal.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision should mainly be of interest to prosecutors handling appeals. The Court’s holding is about preservation, not presentment. The parties assumed that the motion was properly presented.
Johnson v. State
No. PD-0561-20 5/12/21
Issue:
Did an officer have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention when he saw someone sitting in a car in the dark at a park-and-ride after midnight?
Holding:
Yes. The Court explained “reasonable suspicion does not require negating the possibility of an innocent explanation.” Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the court held the officer had reasonable suspicion “because the parking lot had a significant association with criminal activity and because the occupants of the vehicle engaged in activity that appeared secretive and was unusual for the time and place.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Walker, J.):
“The actual totality of the circumstances do[es] not combine to reasonably suggest imminent criminal conduct. … Whether the detention was premature or whether it represented a disregard for the Constitution, the nearly-immediate decision to detain a person sitting in a car, with no indication that the person was engaged in criminal activity other than sitting there in the dark, undermines the public trust in law enforcement and the entire justice system.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This case will now become your newest standard when dealing with ordinary “street” detentions. One interesting aspect is how the Court rationalizes the trial court’s findings of fact when they vary slightly from the trial testimony and where the trial court made no explicit findings regarding the officer’s credibility. Just because a given situation might have an innocent explanation does not mean it cannot be the basis for a detention if it is suspicious to an officer. Here, although lawfully parked in a public parking lot at night, the officer articulated facts that had aroused his suspicion.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Yoda v. State
No. 11-19-00191-CR 5/6/21
Issue:
Did a trial court correctly resolve that an officer could form reasonable suspicion that a defendant was speeding without the use of a radar?
Holding:
Yes. Based on the officer’s testimony that it took him awhile to catch up to the defendant, his top speed was 73 miles per hour, and his familiarity “with the way a vehicle appears when traveling highway speed” versus the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour, the Court held there were “specific and articulable facts that show[ed] that an objective officer could have reasonable suspicion that, under the totality of the circumstances, [the defendant] was speeding in the officer’s presence.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
“Driving too fast you were, yes yes. Driving too fast. The officer, facts he stated, his suspicion reasonable it was. This was no mere conclusion!” For those of you who did not grow up in the ‘80s watching Star Wars, the appellate court notes that an officer can reasonably conclude a motorist is speeding even without a radar gun. The key lesson here is how the Court distinguishes Ford v. State and points out that the officer’s testimony was not conclusory.
Golatt v. State
Nos. 01-19-00904-CR & -00905-CR 5/11/21
Issue:
Did a trial court correctly refuse to reopen the evidence during the punishment phase to allow a victim to testify to a statement already made by the victim’s mother?
Holding:
Yes.* “Because the jury heard the very evidence that [the defendant] urge[d] it should have heard, albeit from a different witness, and this evidence was limited in scope and general in nature, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the evidence.” Read opinion.
* Note: The holding has been updated to correct an error.
Commentary:
This probably won’t come up often, but the Court gives a clean and straightforward analysis that will be easy to apply if you need it. It is difficult to see how cumulative evidence could materially change the outcome of the case.
Texas Attorney General Opinion
KP-0370 5/5/21
Issue:
Does Government Code §3000.002 prohibit political subdivisions from adopting paint color and pattern requirements?
Conclusion:
Section 3000.002(a)(1) prohibits a governmental entity from adopting an ordinance or other regulation that directly or indirectly prohibits or limits the use of products or materials approved for use by certain national model codes. Determining whether an ordinance adopting color palette and pattern requirements prohibits or limits, directly or indirectly, a model code approval would require “investigation into and resolution of fact questions, which is beyond the purview of the opinion process.” Read opinion.