Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
State v. Young
No. PD-0526-25 5/14/26
Issue:
When an appealing party makes multiple arguments against a trial court’s ruling and pursues only one on appeal, can a court of appeals ignore that argument, assume the trial court was correct about an abandoned argument, and affirm?
Holding:
No. The State’s two arguments in this DWI case—community caretaking and consensual encounter—were independent arguments against suppression of evidence rather than independent reasons to uphold the suppression ruling, which the court of appeals incorrectly failed to recognize. “Had the State raised both of these arguments on appeal, the court of appeals would have been required to address both to properly dispose of the appeal. But the State was not obligated to raise both. It could decide to save itself and the court of appeals the trouble by raising what it perceived to be its strongest argument. And that is what it did. The court of appeals should have addressed the claim.” The Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for the lower court to address the merits of the State’s consensual encounter claim. Read opinion.
Concurrence and Dissent (Schenck, P.J., joined by Walker, J.):
The concurrence and dissent agreed that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the State forfeited its consensual encounter argument on appeal but would address the merits in this and similar cases on interlocutory appeal. “[T]his Court’s current precedent defaults toward remand of issues or arguments not reached by the court of appeals opinion, although that same precedent permits us to undertake review under a supposed ‘exception.’ [cites omitted] I believe that framework is rooted in a flawed understanding of our powers under Article V of the Texas Constitution and our obligations under the governing rules and statutes. Put directly, our review of ‘decisions’ is a review of the lower court’s disposition and judgment, not of the particulars of any opinion or opinions they issue, and we should stop indicating otherwise.” Read concurrence and dissent.
Commentary:
When the State posits multiple reasons why an officer’s conduct was lawful, or challenged evidence is admissible, but the trial court suppresses the contested evidence anyway, the State may choose to advance any or all of its independent arguments against suppression on appeal, and the appellate court may affirm the trial court’s ruling only if none of the independent arguments against suppression that the State opted to pursue are viable. Stated alternatively, “if one of the State’s independent theories for denying relief is correct, then the trial court’s ruling is not correct” and must be reversed. This is an important reminder that, during suppression hearings, prosecutors should assert all conceivable independent arguments that support the legality of an officer’s conduct or contested evidence. Failure to do so will forfeit any un-presented theories and limit any State’s appeal to only those arguments that the State did raise, per conventional error-preservation rules (which apply equally to any appellant, whether the State or the defendant is in that role).
Texas Courts of Appeals
Archie v. State
No. 13-25-00551-CR 5/7/26
Issue:
If a jury charge instructed the jury to find the defendant guilty of assault if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” hit the victim while the charging instrument used “and” instead of “or” for the culpable mental state, has the jury charge impermissibly expanded the mental culpability for the State to obtain a conviction?
Holding:
No. “This matter does not involve a charging instrument alleging different methods of committing an offense, but, if it did, it would still be acceptable under Texas law. … Therefore, the mere difference in mental states between the information and jury charge did not improperly expand the proof needed where the jury verdict was unanimous as it was here.” The Court compared this case to Riley v. State, No. 04-01-00648-CR (Tex. App. — San Antonio June 12, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), in which the San Antonio Court determined that “[t]he fact that an indictment alleges matters in the conjunctive and the charge requires proof in the disjunctive, does not constitute reversible error.” In this case, the Court found that while Riley was “not precedential, we agree with our sister court’s analysis and adopt it here.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This opinion provides a helpful reminder of the well-tread premise that the State may allege an offense’s culpable mental state in the conjunctive (“and”), but the trial court may charge the jury on mens rea in the disjunctive (“or”) without improperly expanding the mens rea element of the crime. Note that the same principle applies in similar situations involving alternative manners and means of committing an offense. That is, the State may allege alternative manners and means of committing a single crime against a sole victim in the conjunctive, but the trial court may charge the jury on those alternative methods of committing that single crime in the disjunctive, without creating a unanimity issue.
Federal District Court Puts SB 4 on Hold
On May 14, a U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, in a 78-page opinion in L.M.L. & K.G.S. v. Martin, No. 1:26-CV-01170-DAE, issued a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of most of SB 4 (specifically, enforcing Penal Code §§51.03 and 51.04 and Code of Criminal Procedure Arts. 5B.002 and 5B.003). The plaintiffs, who are noncitizens residing in Austin, filed suit on pre-emption grounds against SB 4’s re-entry and removal provisions, which makes it a crime for noncitizens to enter, attempt to enter, or be found in Texas after they have “been denied admission to” or removed from the United States while an order of removal is outstanding.
The federal district court concluded that the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial threat of enforcement, which was enough to meet the standing requirement. The district court summarized “the properly framed inquiry here: whether the provisions of SB 4 that Plaintiffs challenge may be constitutionally enforced against them pursuant to the State War Clause, as Defendant contends, or whether they are preempted by federal law, as Plaintiffs argue.” The district court concluded that by “regulating a sphere dominated by federal interests, SB 4 violates the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, it is implausible to imagine each of the fifty United States having their own state immigration policy superseding the powers inherent in the United States as a Nation.”
Note that the district court did not enjoin enforcement of the entry provisions found in Penal Code §51.02 (illegal entry other than at a port of entry), a Class B misdemeanor, nor did it enjoin Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 42A.059 (no probation or deferred adjudication for a Chapter 51 offense), so persons caught in the act of crossing the border in violation of §51.02 may now be subject to those provisions.