U.S. Supreme Court
Caniglia v. Strom, et al.
No. 20-157 5/17/21
Issue:
Does the community caretaking doctrine authorize warrantless searches and seizures in a home?
Holding:
No. The community caretaking exception to the warrants requirement is limited to vehicles and does not apply to warrantless entry into homes, citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). The community caretaking doctrine’s “recognition that police officers perform many civic tasks in modern society was just that—a recognition that these tasks exist, and not an open-ended license to perform them anywhere.” Read opinion.
Concurrence (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer, J.):
The Chief Justice wrote to explain that the decision does not affect prior Supreme Court cases holding that a warrant to enter a home is not required when there is a need to assist someone who is seriously injured or threatened with injury.
Concurrence (Alito, J.):
“The Court holds—and I entirely agree—that there is no special Fourth Amendment rule for a broad category of cases involving ‘community caretaking.’ As I understand the term, it describes the many police tasks that go beyond criminal law enforcement. These tasks vary widely, and there is no clear limit on how far they might extend in the future. The category potentially includes any non-law-enforcement work that a community chooses to assign, and because of the breadth of activities that may be described as community caretaking, we should not assume that the Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness applies in the same way to everything that might be viewed as falling into this broad category.”
Concurrence (Kavanaugh, J.):
Justice Kavanaugh agreed with Chief Justice Roberts that this decision does not prevent officers from taking reasonable steps to assist people inside a home who are in need of aid. For example, officers may enter a home without a warrant to try to prevent a potential suicide or “help an elderly person who has been out of contact and may have fallen and suffered a serious injury,” but this situation might be better labeled as an exigent-circumstances exception than an exception under community caretaking.
Commentary:
This is a four page “unanimous” opinion followed by 13 pages of concurrences. Curious minds might wonder whether some of the newer justices on the Court are uncomfortable with various exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Texas Supreme Court
Ex parte R.P.G.P.
No. 19-1051 5/17/21
Issue:
Is an arrest involving multiple misdemeanor offenses divisible for purposes of expunging arrest records under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 55.01?
Holding:
Yes. Under Art. 55.01(a)(2)(A) (which concerns dismissals and plea bargains), misdemeanor offenses are eligible for expunction individually. The Court rejected the “arrest-based” construction of the statute that many courts of appeals have used, and instead adopted an offense-based approach, as it had done in State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. 2018) (construing Art. 55.01(a)(1) and expunctions on the basis of acquittal or pardon). Read opinion.
Dissent (Bland, J., joined by Blacklock and Huddle, J.J.):
“A person charged with multiple felonies must satisfy the expunction prerequisites for each felony arising out of the same transaction, the Court theorizes, but a person charged with multiple misdemeanors need only satisfy the expunction prerequisites for a particular misdemeanor. Its holding is contrary to the plain meaning of Article 55.01(a)(2)(A).” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This case represents a good example of why a strict textual approach to statutory construction may be difficult to apply to evolving statutory schemes. The expunction statute has been amended many times over the years. The statute uses the terms “offense” and “arrest” in willy-nilly fashion, which was the source of the dispute the Court resolved. There is little evidence that the Legislature meant different things when it used these different words, especially in light of its failure to clarify the words in multiple acts amending the statute over the years. Nevertheless, the Court held that the words have different meanings. But, the Court’s hedging in its opinion regarding felonies is contrary to the Texas Code Construction Act and well-accepted canons of construction. Moreover, the Court’s refusal to consider the effects of its construction reveals that the Court has a decidedly 20th century view of how records are stored by criminal justice agencies. Sure, it might have been easy to redact a paper file in 1991, but in 2021, criminal records are often stored in a relational database purpose-designed to prevent alteration of documents, as well as proprietary media that cannot be edited by end users.
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Hammack v. State
No. PD-0636-19 5/19/21
Issue:
Must the State prove a defendant was served with a copy of an emergency protective order removing a child from custody to establish that a person committed Interference with Child Custody?
Holding:
No. “The plain terms of the statute [PC §25.03(a)(1)] only require proof that the person who takes or retains a child in violation of a judgment or order, including a temporary one, knows that he or she is doing so in violation of such an order. Proof that the person has been served with a temporary order may satisfy the State’s burden to prove such knowledge, but it is not required if knowledge can be proven through other means.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Keller, P.J. joined by Keel, J.):
“The State had to prove that [the defendant] was aware not only that the order awarded custody to the [Texas Department of Family and Protective Services], but that it also deprived him of any kind of custody. The record in this case contains no evidence that [the defendant] was aware of that.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This opinion turns largely on the statutory language in §25.03. The Court distinguished its opinion in Harvey, where it held that prosecution for violation of a protective order under §25.07 did require proof that the defendant was served with a copy of the order.
Ex parte Andrus
No. WR-84,438-01 5/19/21
Issue:
Was defense counsel constitutionally ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence, and would that evidence have outweighed the State’s evidence enough to result in a different outcome at the defendant’s sentencing hearing?
Holding:
No. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court performed an independent review of the defendant’s new mitigation evidence, focusing on the second prong of Strickland and potential prejudice. The Court concluded the mitigating evidence was “relatively weak” and would not have outweighed the “strong and substantial” aggravating evidence, creating a reasonable probability that the sentencing hearing would not have been different. Read opinion.
Dissent (Newell, J., joined by Hervey, Richardson, and Walker, J.J.):
“The United States Supreme Court is not last because it is always right, they are only right because they are always last. … This Court is not free to ‘re-characterize’ … evidence contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding. We are bound by the United States Supreme Court’s characterization. … Because this Court does not properly apply controlling Supreme Court precedent in this case, I dissent.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
These opinions are most noteworthy for the way each of them push back against the Supreme Court’s opinion remanding the case. The majority makes clear that the Court of Criminal Appeals considered both parts of the defendant’s claim in its original opinion and spends much time correcting mistakes the Supreme Court made in its opinion and pointing out other evidence it may have missed. The dissent, while agreeing with the majority in many respects, believes the Supreme Court has already determined that the defendant should receive a new trial. Experience shows that juries are seldom swayed by the type of evidence at issue here. It is likely, however, that another jury will have to consider this evidence some years from now.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Salinas v. State
No. 13-19-00504-CR 5/13/21
Issue:
Did the defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a thumb drive found in the truck he had taken to a mechanic to run diagnostic tests?
Holding:
Yes. However, the Court determined the mechanics working on the truck did not commit a crime in viewing the thumb drive (and discovering child pornography on it), because the thumb drive was not a “computer” for purposes of Penal Code §33.02(a). Additionally, the Court held an officer’s later search of the thumb drive turned over to him by the mechanics fell under the private search exception. Therefore, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the pornography found in the warrantless search. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is a thorough and helpful opinion illustrating how private searches work under Texas law. Had the mechanics violated Texas statutes when they accessed the thumb drive, the contents would be inadmissible under Article 38.23. But, if not, then even though their acts might be unlawful if performed by police, they did not require suppression of the contraband images. This decision may go higher due to a split in the federal circuits regarding the private search doctrine.
Flores-Garnica v. State
No. 02-20-00016-CR 5/13/12
Issue:
Did the State sufficiently prove that an ATV was a motor vehicle for purposes of the DWI statute?
Holding:
Yes. Interpreting the definition of a “motor vehicle” for DWI cases from the language in Penal Code §32.34(a) (“a device in, on, or by which a person or property is or may be transported or drawn on a highway …”), the Court held the jury was “free to read may to indicate possibility.” Therefore, because the evidence showed the possibility that the ATV was able to transport a person and property on a highway, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the ATV was a motor vehicle. Read opinion.
Commentary:
Yes, a Texas appellate court really was required to analyze whether driving an ATV while drunk is sufficient to prove driving while intoxicated.
Moore v. State
No. 14-19-00466-CR 5/18/21
Issue:
Were the trial court’s comments on the relevancy of defense counsel’s line of questioning improper comments on the weight of the evidence in violation of Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.05?
Holding:
Yes. The trial court’s commentary on the probability of what was occurring in a video was improper and material. “[T]he trial court became, in essence, an advocate for the State … [and]… denigrated [the defendant’s] attempts to impeach the complainant. …” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The State should seek discretionary review in this case. Introductory drama notwithstanding, the opinion seems to show a trial judge trying to control a courtroom, not taking sides in a dispute. But judges will do best when they limit their remarks in front of the jury to “granted, overruled, denied, sustained, move along, and the jury shall remember the evidence.”