U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Wilson, et al v. Stroman, et al
Nos. 20-50367, -50372, -50380, -50408, and -50453 4/28/22
Issue:
Did the district court correctly grant law enforcement defendants’ motion to dismiss claims of false arrest under the Fourth Amendment after applying the independent intermediary doctrine?
Holding:
No. Although the Independent Intermediary Doctrine (IID) serves to break the chain of causation for false arrest when an officer presents facts supporting the arrest to an independent intermediary (here a magistrate), if a plaintiff can show that an officer obtained an arrest warrant from a magistrate in violation of Franks v. Delaware, then IID does not apply. Further, when a second intermediary is involved (here a grand jury), the plaintiff may show the deliberations by the second intermediary were also tainted (“taint exception”) in a similar fashion as the first intermediary. Because the district court did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims that were relevant to whether the IID should apply, the Court concluded the district court should first decide whether each plaintiff “adequately alleged a Franks violation … and if so, whether each plaintiff … also adequately alleged that the taint exception should apply to the grand jury’s subsequent indictment.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
These cases stem from the shootout between motorcycle club members at a Twin Peaks in Waco in 2015, wherein 177 people were arrested for Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity. The plaintiffs (arrested motorcyclists) sought to bring a federal civil action for deprivation of rights (also known as a “§1983 action” because the suit is brought pursuant to 42 USCA § 1983) against the arresting officers, various public officials, and others for false arrest, premised upon supposed defects in a “fill-in-the-blanks” form warrant affidavit that was used to obtain arrest warrants for every arrestee. The Fifth Circuit’s specific determination here—i.e., that the independent intermediary doctrine (IID) will not shield an officer from §1983 liability if the plaintiff sufficiently establishes that a grand jury was not a truly independent intermediary because the grand jurors relied on the same false information that misled a magistrate into issuing an arrest warrant—will be largely of only academic interest to Texas prosecutors who do not often go into federal court to address civil §1983 lawsuits.
However, since Texas prosecutors often encounter motions to suppress arrests based on faulty arrest warrants, this case provides a good opportunity to review Franks v. Delaware, 483 U.S. 154 (1978), and be mindful that an officer commits a Franks violation if he “deliberately or recklessly provides false, material information for use in an affidavit in support of [a warrant]” or “makes knowing and intentional omissions that result in a warrant being issued without probable cause.”
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Ex parte Edwards
No. PD-1092-20 5/4/22
Issue:
Is a defendant, in a pretrial habeas setting, entitled to relief where the State did not include facts in its indictment showing the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations, as required by CCP Art. 21.02(6)?
Holding:
No. Pretrial habeas is not the proper avenue to challenge a limitation claim because the State is permitted to amend its indictment by alleging an exception to the statute of limitations. Instead, a defendant may raise the issue in a motion to dismiss under CCP Art. 27.08(2) or even present the argument as a defense at trial. Read opinion.
Dissent (Yeary, J. joined by Walker J.):
Prior to this decision, a defendant could challenge an indictment that appears to show the offense he’s charged with is barred by the statute of limitations. The majority is now requiring the defendant “to endure a full-blown trial before he may be afforded an opportunity to vindicate his lawful right to avoid having to endure a full-blown trial.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is an important case for trial and appellate prosecutors alike because defendants seem to be filing more pretrial habeas corpus applications; thus, it is imperative to know what claims are and are not cognizable via that avenue of review. As this case explains, when the defendant’s claim is not a constitutional one that requires resolution before trial and there are ways to remedy the particular defect at issue aside from pretrial habeas proceedings, the claim should not be cognizable via the “extraordinary remedy” of pretrial habeas.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Vitela v. State
Nos. 04-19-00737-CR & -00738-CR 4/27/22
Issue:
After denying a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence before trial, can a trial court include facts and evidence established at trial in its later written ruling on the motion to suppress?
Holding:
Yes. A trial court has continuing jurisdiction over a case it is presiding over and may revisit its decision to deny a motion to suppress at any time during trial. Therefore, a trial court may include facts and evidence established during trial when issuing its written ruling on a motion to suppress. Read opinion.
Commentary:
Trial judges often request that the prevailing party in a suppression issue prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (FOF/COL) for the court, and these proposed FOF/COL are often drafted and submitted after the trial has concluded. So keep this case handy and remember that you may include facts and evidence developed at trial, too, not just information presented in the suppression hearing. Though this opinion does not address other scenarios where written findings of fact and conclusions of law are required, (such as when a trial court determines that a defendant’s statement is voluntary and admissible, under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.22, §6) it is reasonable to believe that the appellate court’s holding here would similarly apply in those contexts.
Attorney General Opinion Requests
RQ-0456-KP 4/28/22
Issue:
Who qualifies as a “retired judge” for appointment as a visiting judge in the absence of the constitutional county judge under Tex. Gov’t Code §26.023?
Requested by:
John K. Greenwood, Lampasas County Attorney
RQ-0485-KP 4/19/22
Issue:
Does Penal Code §43.21(a)(2) prohibit the possession, sale, and distribution of “child-like sex dolls”?
Requested by:
Matt Krause, Chairman, Texas House Committee on General Investigating
RQ-0457-KP 4/19/22
Issue:
Are amusement machines considered gambling devices within the meaning of Penal Code §47.01(4), where the amount awarded from play is determined partially by chance?
Requested by:
Scott Brumley, Potter County Attorney
Randall Sims, 47th District Attorney
Robert Love, Randall County Criminal District Attorney
TDCAA Advanced Appellate Course Application Deadline May 16, 2022
This course is designed for prosecutors who are assigned primarily to an appellate caseload or have significant mixed trial and appellate experience who want to prepare and participate in a hands-on course to increase their effectiveness in brief writing and oral argument. If you are interested in attending, please review the posted brochure on our website to review conditions, dates, and locations.