Texas Courts of Appeals
Cardona Avila v. State
No. 01-25-00022-CR 11/13/26
Issue:
Is Penal Code §46.02(a)(2)(A) (carrying a handgun by a person under 21) facially unconstitutional?
Holding:
No. The defendant argued that he did not need to establish that §46.02(a) operates unconstitutionally to defendants under 18 at the time of the offense because this burden shifted to the State under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Court, however, rejected that argument, concluding that “[b]ecause [the defendant] has not established that the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct of an individual under 18 years of age who commits an offense under §46.01(a), the burden of justifying §46.02(a) as to those individuals has not shifted to the State, and [the defendant] has not carried his burden of showing that §46.02(a) operates unconstitutionally in all circumstances.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Remember that a defendant making a facial constitutionality challenge to a statute bears the burden to show that the provision always operates unconstitutionally, in every possible circumstance. Because a facial challenge does not depend on particular facts, the defendant may raise a facial challenge in a pretrial motion, such as a motion to quash the charging instrument. Conversely, a defendant making an as-applied constitutionality challenge to a statute must establish that the provision operates unconstitutionally only as to him, which is generally an easier showing than with a facial challenge, but, crucially, may be done only once facts are developed at trial (i.e., not pretrial).
Here, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to quash challenging the constitutionality of §46.02(a) as applied to the defendant in light of his particular age group (persons between 18 and 21 years of age), but he failed to develop any facts at trial to support his as-applied claim because he accepted a plea bargain after the trial court denied his motion to quash. On appeal, the defense attempted to get around this procedural misstep by framing his constitutionality challenge as a facial challenge instead. The appellate court was unpersuaded and rejected the defense’s arguments, regardless of whether his challenge was characterized as facial or as-applied. Note, though, that because this defendant did not develop any facts to support an as-applied challenge, the question of whether §46.02(a) may be constitutionally applied to persons aged 18 to 21 remains open and likely will arise again.
Guerrero v. State
No. 14-25-01133-CR 11/17/26
Issue:
Did a victim’s statements qualify as excited utterances over the defendant’s contention that the prosecution did not develop evidence in support of that theory?
Holding:
Yes. Even though a recording of the victim’s 911 call was not entered into evidence, the first deputy on the scene testified that the victim was still “shaken up” when he arrived and had visible swelling over her eye, a photo of which was admitted into evidence. “Given all this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably determined that the complainant made her statements to the 911 operator when she was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of a violent assault. We likewise conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the complainant’s statements were admissible as excited utterances.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The complainant’s statements in her 911 call were recorded in a written dispatch report, which the State offered via the business-records exception to the general rule against hearsay. The appellate court observed that, although the business-records exception was applicable to the dispatch report overall, the complainant’s statements to the 911 operator, as recorded in the dispatch report, were an additional level of hearsay (i.e., hearsay within hearsay) that required justification by an additional hearsay exception. Although neither the prosecutor nor the trial court specifically identified the excited-utterance exception as that second justification, the prosecutor did develop testimony that demonstrated that the excited utterance exception applied. Thus, under the well-settled appellate doctrine that a trial court’s ruling must be upheld if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case—even if the trial court does not expressly rely on the winning theory—the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s admission of the dispatch report. This opinion shows the clear benefit for prosecutors who, as here, thoroughly develop the record concerning a first responder’s impressions of the complainant’s demeanor and appearance, even if it’s not immediately apparent that those details are necessary for the hearsay exception that the prosecutor believes is most applicable.
Hampton v. State
No. 01-24-00998-CR 11/13/26
Issue:
Did the State impermissibly misstate the law of self-defense in its jury argument?
Holding:
No. In the defendant’s trial for murder, in which he claimed self-defense, the prosecutor spoke in closing argument about the definition of “reasonable belief” and told jurors that it was an objective standard about what an ordinary and prudent person would believe, not what the defendant subjectively believed: “You don’t get to start the problem, … show up uninvited, get on someone’s property, demand to see their daughter and then not leave … go get a gun and come sit on their property and then say I had to kill somebody in self-defense.” The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the State’s argument “invented two categorical rules that Texas law does not recognize: that trespass forfeits self-defense and that retrieving a firearm forfeits self-defense,” instead finding that the defendant’s “categorical reading of the State’s argument is not the only reading, nor is it the reading that makes the most sense in context. The complained-of statement came in the context of discussing factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the [defendant’s] supposed defensive belief.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Self-defense can be a complicated area of the law and, of course, it is important that prosecutors avoid misstating the tenets of self-defense at any point in trial, from voir dire through closing arguments. This case provides very helpful and instructive examples of appropriate statements on the law of self-defense, particularly in the areas of the ordinary and prudent person standard of belief as to whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable and the “stand your ground” law. Prosecutors who have an approaching trial that will involve self-defense should read this opinion for a good refresher on these topics.