Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Philpot v. State
No. PD-0715-25 11/5/26
Issue:
Does the forgery statute (Penal Code §32.21) encompass instruments that purport to be the acts of fictitious persons?
Holding:
Yes. The defendant created a fictious bank and wrote a cashier’s check for another person’s bail that was purportedly issued by the fictious bank and signed by its treasurer. The defendant took the fictitious check, made payable through the fictitious bank to the sheriff’s office, to the bond desk at the sheriff’s office. A clerk accepted the cashier’s check and began processing the bond, but a supervisor voided the transaction based on concerns about the check’s validity. During the investigation of the check, the check was found not to be valid. The defendant told an officer that he had created the check at a business supply store, and he was indicted for forgery of a financial instrument. The defendant argued that the check was valid under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), that the bank was a trust company operating under Article 3 of the UCC, that he served as its trustee and treasurer, and that “everyone is a bank.” The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that §32.21 does not encompass instruments that purport to be the acts of a fictitious person. “First, the forgery statute covers any writing that ‘purports’ to be the act of another. … Second, even assuming that the statute is ambiguous, there is nothing in Penal Code Section 32.21 that requires the State to prove that the ‘another’ who purportedly made the writing subject to the forgery prosecution is a real individual or entity.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The defendant attempted to use a cashier’s check, on its face valued at over $1 million, to bond out a man charged with murder, robbery, and other crimes. The check is reproduced on page 3 of the court’s opinion, and it was purported to be authorized by a bank that the court found did not exist and was, therefore, fictitious. (At trial, the State presented an extraneous offense, in which the defendant created a check—reproduced on page 5 of the court’s opinion and allegedly valued at over $100,000 in order to purchase a BMW). The defendant repeatedly denied at trial that he created the cashier’s check, insisting that it had been created by the bank. The court held that was sufficient to show that the check was purported to have been created by “another.” The court also held that it did not matter that the “other” was a fictitious entity. This decision should be helpful in addressing future forgery cases, in which defendants attempt to use fictitious persons or entities as authorizing the check. Prosecutors should, however, be careful to distinguish the three cases upon which the defendant relied, discussed on pages 13 to 14 of the court’s opinion.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Price v. State
No. 12-25-00308-CR 10/30/26
Issue:
Can the specific conduct of a victim practicing martial arts be considered a prior violent act that would serve to establish a defendant’s reasonable need to defend himself with deadly force?
Holding:
No. The Court concluded that the defendant “does not cite, and we do not find, any Texas jurisprudence addressing whether a deceased person’s general statements to a murder defendant about his fighting ability, made more than one year before the incident, are admissible to show the defendant’s state of mind at the time of [the] incident.” The defendant, who was involved in a property-line dispute with the victim’s mother, shot and killed the victim after exchanging words. The jury found him guilty of murder. The Court rejected the defendant’s defensive theory that that size and age difference between him and the victim, combined with the victim’s martial arts training, supported a reasonable fear that the victim could cause the defendant serious bodily injury. “[T]here was no evidence presented that [the victim] ever behaved violently toward anyone. [The defendant] admittedly had no knowledge of any violent altercations or of [the victim] having a general reputation for violence in the community. [The defendant’s] testimony as to how he came to know that [victim] was a ‘fifth-degree black belt’ would not have added any such evidence.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
There are a number of different rules dealing with the admissibility of testimony or evidence regarding a victim’s violent character or past conduct. In this case, the defendant wanted to offer the evidence of the victim’s alleged violent conduct to show his apprehension of danger from the victim to help support his claim of self-defense. Under that approach, the law requires the defendant to be aware of the victim’s prior violent conduct. Courts often call this “communicated character” evidence. The holding that the court reached in this case is that practicing martial arts is not necessarily violent conduct, so as to make it admissible under an apprehension-of-danger theory. The Court found that the defense did not present ample underlying reasons for the admission of this testimony, neither at trial nor on appeal. As it stands, this decision should be helpful in claiming that a martial arts background (or perhaps even competitive fighting)—standing alone—is not evidence of violence that would provide the foundation for a defendant’s self-defense claim. Prosecutors should be careful to consider the reasons that the defense wishes to offer this kind of testimony or evidence. There is a great deal of case law on this and related issues, which prosecutors should research to ensure the defense is relying on relevant case law regarding specific reasons the defense wants to offer this evidence. If relevant, this evidence may very well be admissible, and prosecutors should not object to it.
In re State of Texas ex rel. Silva
No. 13-26-00733-CR 10/27/26
Issue:
After a defense attorney contended he had not received an audio recording from the State, did a visiting judge incorrectly broaden the scope of Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 39.14 in requiring the district attorney’s office to email, call, and produce discovery repeatedly to the defense?
Holding:
No. In an unpublished opinion on the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, the Court concluded that the State had not established the requirements for mandamus that the State had “no other adequate remedy at law … available to redress the alleged harm and the act [sought] is ministerial, rather than discretionary, in nature.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is not a decision that applies Article 39.14 to a specific set of facts. It is not a discovery decision. It is very short decision similar to others that courts often issue in mandamus proceedings. Even under the best of circumstances, it can be very difficult to obtain mandamus relief. That is all this decision should communicate. Nothing more. Do not let a defense lawyer claim that this decision has any precedential value in the discovery context in general, or under Article 39.14 in particular.
Notice: Annual Business Meeting (2026)
The Annual Business Meeting of the Texas District and County Attorneys Association will take place on Wednesday, December 2, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. at the Texas A&M Hotel & Conference Center, 177 Joe Routt Blvd., College Station, Texas.
At this meeting, voting members of the association will select officeholders to fill vacancies on TDCAA’s Board of Directors for 2027. The Nominations Committee has put forth the following slate of officer candidates to be voted upon at that meeting:
President-Elect: Jacob Putman, Smith Co. Criminal DA
Secretary-Treasurer: Rickie Redman, Lamb Co. C&DA
CDA-at-large: Kenda Culpepper, Rockwall Co. Criminal DA
CA-at-large: Trey Brown, Sumervell Co. CA
Regional caucuses will also meet and elect their own directors for Regions 1, 2, 4, and 7. A map of TDCAA’s regions is available here.
For questions about the Annual Business Meeting, contact Shannon Edmonds.