Court of Criminal Appeals
Ex parte Chanthakoummane
No. WR-78,107-02 10/7/20
Issue:
- Is the defendant entitled to relief based on evidence presented from the defendant’s forensic psychologist with expertise in hypnosis that discredits the trial testimony of two testifying witnesses?
- Is the defendant entitled to relief based on bitemark testimony in which the scientific community’s standards discredit bitemark comparisons?
- Is the defendant entitled to relief based on recent advances in the scientific field of DNA regarding flawed statistical methodology utilized by the Texas Department of Public Safety in DNA mixture cases?
Holding:
- No. The defendant failed to establish that the critiques against hypnotism in a forensic setting contained in recent scientific studies were not known and available at the time of the defendant’s trial, pursuant to Art. 11.073(b)(1)(A). The State’s expert witness, a psychiatrist with expertise in hypnosis, disputed the defendant’s contention that recent studies have changed the field of scientific knowledge. The expert witness testified at the evidentiary hearing that the same myths and risks associated with using hypnosis to assist with memory recall have been well known in the scientific field since at least the mid-1980s.
- No. The bitemark testimony at the evidentiary hearing was consistent with the Court’s opinion in Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), in which the Court recognized the scientific community’s changed standards discrediting bitemark comparisons. Under the new standards, the bitemark comparison testimony would not have been admissible. However, the Court agreed with the trial court’s assessment that, even without the bitemark comparison testimony, the jury still would have convicted the defendant based on the strength of the remaining evidence.
- No. At the evidentiary hearing, the State presented recalculated DNA statistics under the current standards. The statistical calculations matching the defendant’s DNA profile in the single-source samples did not change. Although the statistical calculations in the mixed source samples changed, the defendant was still included as a contributor to those samples. The recalculated results continued to show that the defendant was at the crime scene and that his DNA was under the victim’s fingernails. Thus, the defendant failed to demonstrate that, had the recalculated DNA results been presented at trial, on the preponderance of the evidence he would not have been convicted. Read Opinion.
Dissenting (Newell, J., joined by Richardson, J., and Walker, J.):
“In light of Tillman, I believe we should revisit our precedent evaluating the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony. I would file and set this case with briefing by the parties to address that issue. Because this Court does not, I respectfully dissent.” Read Opinion.
Commentary:
The first and primary thing to know about the majority’s order in this case is that it is not, and does not purport to be, a review of the admissibility or inadmissibility of specific pieces of evidence. If you want to introduce (or oppose the introduction of) hypnotically enhanced testimony, bitemark evidence, or DNA evidence, do not rely upon this decision. There is no analysis under Chapter 7 of the Rules of Evidence. The importance of this decision is that discusses application of a particular statute allowing for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus—Art. 11.073 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. And in that regard, the majority’s unpublished order pays some deference to the trial court’s findings in support of denying relief. The jurisprudence for that statute is still being developed, but there are other published decisions from the court that more deeply address the application of Art. 11.073.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Stredic v. State
No. 14-18-00162-CR 9/29/20
Issue:
Does the Code of Criminal Procedure generally allow the State to act unless a provision in the Code specifically prohibits that action?
Holding:
No. The State argued that even though Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 36.28 did not authorize trial courts to give transcripts to jurors, it did not prohibit such a practice either. The State argued that any practice not specifically prohibited by the Code of Criminal Procedure must be allowed. The Court rejected this argument, stating that even if the State’s view of its powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure were correct, it would require an implausible reading of Art. 36.28. The Court further stated that adopting the State’s theory “would render Art. 36.28 a nullity, a toothless provision merely containing two examples of ways in which testimony possibly might be provided to the jury, as opposed to delineating the only two ways the jury is permitted to receive it.” Read Opinion.
Commentary:
This case has had a lively history on appeal so far, first getting affirmed back in November 2019 and then getting reversed on rehearing in August of this year. This most recent opinion is a relatively short supplemental opinion, underscoring the majority’s interpretation of Art. 38.28. Because of the split of opinion on the court, and the importance of the construction of that statute, you might expect review by the Court of Criminal Appeals. In the meantime, the safest course of action is to follow the strict wording of the statute.
Smith v. State
No. 14-19-00097-CR through -00100-CR 9/29/20
Issue:
Did the trial court fail to consider that the defendant’s mental illness and intellectual disabilities compromised his ability to understand the applicable range of punishment, thereby rendering his guilty plea involuntary?
Holding:
No. Having confirmed the defendant understood the charges against him and the range of possible punishment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Here, the defendant initialed “habitual offender” in the plea documents and the signed plea papers, indicting the defendant was entering his plea freely and voluntarily. Moreover, the record of the plea hearing indicated he understood his habitual offender status and the range of punishment after the trial judge explicitly asked him. Finally, the Court noted that the defendant relied on a report from a psychiatrist who found he was competent. Although the psychiatrist concluded the defendant appeared to suffer from “Unspecified Intellectual Disability” and “Schizophreniform Disorder” and possessed a “low average IQ,” he also determined that the defendant understood the charges and the range of punishment and was capable of engaging in his defense. Read Opinion.
Concurring (Frost, J.):
“To the extent [the defendant] now relies on Dr. Cantu’s report or argues that [his] mental illness and intellectual disabilities prevented him from understanding the range of punishment, [the defendant] did not preserve error in the trial court. [The defendant] preserved error on his complaint that he was not informed of the applicable range of punishment, but this complaint lacks merit because the record shows that [the defendant] was informed of the applicable range of punishment. Read Opinion.
Commentary:
The majority’s decision is a relatively straightforward application of the rules for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea and the deference that is afforded to the trial court on that issue. To the extent that the defendant did not sufficiently raise his mental deficiencies at trial, as contended by the State and the concurring opinion, you could see this issue raised again on a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus.