5th Circuit Court of Appeals
U.S. v. Valas
No. 20-50830 7/8/22
Issue:
Did federal prosecutors unconstitutionally suppress a document that would have aided the defendant’s prosecution for engaging in a commercial sex act with a minor?
Holding:
No. There was no Brady violation in federal prosecutors failing to produce an FD-302 summary of an FBI interview with the victim because the evidence was not material. The Court noted that the government’s only justification for the lapse—“that the failure to produce the 302 to Valas was ‘inadvertent,’ is troubling. It is difficult to grasp how a document as routine as a 302 would be overlooked, particularly in this instance,” because the victim was the only witness who accused Valas of criminal activity. “We note that, unfortunately, this is not the first time something like this has happened, e.g., United States v. Perea, 625 F.Supp.2d 327 (W.D. Tex. 2009). We admonish the Government to endeavor to make it the last.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate three things: (1) that the State (or federal government, as in this case) failed to disclose information or evidence in its possession, regardless of the prosecution’s good or bad faith; (2) that the undisclosed information or evidence is favorable to the defendant (i.e., anything useful for exculpation, impeachment, or mitigation); and (3) that the undisclosed information or evidence is material. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently explained in Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), that Texas courts must assess materiality of undisclosed information or evidence “by evaluating its relation to a particular subject matter rather than its impact upon the overall determination of guilt or punishment in light of the evidence introduced at trial.” This means that materiality can be difficult to determine without the benefit of hindsight, so the best practice would be to not rely on materiality when making your disclosure decisions. Rather, if the State has information or evidence in its possession that is favorable to the defendant, just disclose it.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Ex parte Highsmith
No. 03-22-00074-CR 6/30/22
Issue:
Is the State required under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.151 to demonstrate full Article 39.14 discovery compliance within the 90-day statutory period for felony offenses?
Holding:
No. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the doctrine of in pari materia requires Articles 17.151 and 39.14 to be read together to require the State to provide full discovery within the 90-day period to be ready for trial. “[N]othing in the plain language of the [Michael Morton] Act or in article 17.151 indicates that this production obligation to the defendant is a component of the State’s own readiness for trial under article 17.151 or hints that the requirements should be read in conjunction with one another or conflict with each other.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This opinion thoughtfully explains that the State’s readiness for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the defendant’s detention for a felony offense (or the defendant is entitled to release on either a personal bond or lower bail (per Article 17.151)), and the State’s duty to provide discoverable material “as soon as practicable” (per Article 39.14) are separate matters governed by different statutes that impose distinct timelines. (Note that Article 39.14 does not contain a specific compliance date for discovery.) The defendant may seek discretionary review of this issue by the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the Third Court of Appeals’s reasoning and holding should withstand the CCA’s scrutiny.
Ex parte Ramirez
No. 03-21-00409-CR 6/30/22
Issue:
If a defendant enters a guilty plea against the advice of his replacement defense attorney (who told the defendant that he had not had time to review the evidence in the case and recommended against accepting the offered plea), is the defendant entitled to habeas relief based on ineffective assistance an involuntary plea?
Holding:
No. By disregarding his attorney’s advice not to enter a plea, the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that his trial attorney’s performance was not reasonable and his plea was involuntary. Read opinion.
Commentary:
When a defendant declines to follow his attorney’s reasonable advice concerning a decision that lies in the defendant’s sole discretion (here, the decision of whether to accept a plea bargain and plead guilty), the defendant cannot later claim (at least not successfully) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Other decisions that belong entirely to the defendant include whether to waive the right to a jury trial, to testify at trial, or to forgo an appeal. This case doesn’t discuss those decisions, but it would be useful should a defendant make an analogous ineffective-assistance claim regarding any of those scenarios.