Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

State v. Pettit

No. PD-0186-24                               5/28/25

Issue:

Did the passenger of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle following an allegedly unreasonably prolonged detention?

Holding:

Yes. In this case, the officer detained the driver—and therefore also the passenger—nearly an hour to wait for a K-9 unit to arrive without reasonable suspicion. “If a passenger has standing to challenge a traffic stop because the stop ‘seizes everyone in the vehicle, not just the driver,’ it follows that the passenger has standing to challenge the prolonged nature of the stop because the passenger is in fact detained and not free to leave.” The Court remanded the case for the court of appeals to consider whether the prolonged detention was reasonable. Read opinion.

Commentary:

With this ruling, jurisprudence from the SCOTUS and the CCA establishes that a passenger in a stopped vehicle has standing to challenge: the legality of the stop itself; the duration of the stop; and any subsequent search of the vehicle, when that search is the result of exploitation of any prior illegality concerning the stop or duration of the detention. Although certainly an important and clear expansion of passengers’ abilities to challenge evidence beyond what was previously explicitly recognized, practically speaking, this decision shouldn’t create much of an additional burden for prosecutors because what constitutes adequate legal justification to stop, prolong a detention, and effect a search as it relates to the driver’s rights will often suffice as to the passenger’s rights in these circumstances.

Armstrong v. State

No. PD-0409-22                               5/28/25

Issue:

Does the “suspicious places” exception to the arrest warrant requirement under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 14.03(a)(1) require exigent circumstances for a warrantless arrest?

Holding:

No. The suspicious places exception requires that: (1) the suspect was found in a suspicious place, and (2) he was found under circumstances that reasonably show an offense has been or is about to be committed. “The issue before this Court is limited to whether Article 14.03(a)(1) includes an exigency requirement. Our conclusion is a definitive no. We have not been tasked with creating a test as to what makes a placesuspicious nor were we asked to provide any missing substance that Article 14.03(a)(1) is lacking. It is not our role to elaborate on the statute’s language.” Read opinion.

Concurrence (Yeary, J., joined by Schenck, P.J.):

“On remand, the court of appeals will now know what not to require in order to justify an arrest under Article 14.03(a)(1): exigent circumstances. And perhaps that is all that needs to be said in the present case, in the posture that it comes before us. But nothing in the Court’s opinion tells the court of appeals on remand the substance of what is required to be found before it may conclude that a person has been ‘found in a suspicious place’ under the statute. At some point the Court must do a better job supplying that substance.” Read concurrence.

Concurrence (Newell, J., joined by Richardson and Walker, JJ.):

“I agree that courts need not consider the existence of exigent circumstances to determine whether a place is ‘suspicious’ when the State relies upon Article 14.03(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to justify a warrantless arrest. … But the State may be in for a rude awakening on how few truly ‘suspicious’ placesthere are. And if we are going to read requirements into the definition of ‘suspicious’ to allow for consideration of facts suggesting the person’s guilt, we are effectively re-writing the statute to make it work the way we think it should rather than deferring to the text of the statute.” Read concurrence.

Commentary:

This opinion provides a clear answer and redirects the intermediate courts of appeals which have read an exigency requirement into the language of Article 14.03(a)(1). As this case instructs, a court tasked with assessing when a “suspicious place” exists must “conduct a fact-specific inquiry made on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances, and without an exigency requirement.” Virtually any place can be “suspicious” and there is no specific test for gauging the suspiciousness of a locale, but generally speaking the considerations that fulfill subsection (2)—circumstances that reasonably show an offense has been or is about to be committed—will be paramount for demonstrating that a particular place is suspicious (or “sus” as the kids call it these days).

In re Green

No. WR-91,714-02                         5/28/25

Issue:

Does Government Code §74.053(d), which allows a visiting judge to be removed from a case in certain circumstances if a party objects, apply to criminal cases?

Holding:

No. Section 74.053(d) applies only to civil cases. In Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), the Court of Criminal Appeals previously held that §74.053(d) did not apply to criminal cases, and the State was not entitled to have a visiting judge removed under that statute. Although the statute was later amended in 2003, the Court concluded that the reasoning in Lanford still applies. While the Court concluded that the administrative judge therefore must rescind his order removing the visiting judge based solely on §74.053(d) and the State’s objection, the administrative judge may consider removing the judge on some other basis. Read opinion.

Dissent (Schenck, P.J., joined in part by Yeary, J.): 

“This Court has never before substantively interpreted the 2003 version of this statute. Instead of doing so today, the Court simply resuscitates our earlier decision in Lanford v. First Court of Appeals, and extends it to the later revisions, explaining that ‘[k]ey aspects of the statute that was construed in Lanford remain the same in the present version of the statute.’ [citation omitted] But Lanford was wrongly decided because the Court departed from traditional rules of statutory construction. Its error has become only more apparent in light of the subsequent revision of the statute.” Read dissent.

Commentary:

Government Code §74.053(d) allows a party to object to an assigned judge or justice “who was defeated in the last primary or general election for which the judge or justice was a candidate for the judicial office held by the judge or justice….”  Given the turbulent nature of contemporary politics, there are good reasons for this provision and perhaps this opinion will inspire the Legislature to someday modify §74.053(d) to extend it to both civil and criminal cases. Until then, though, if you prosecute purely criminal cases (i.e., not juvenile, protective orders, asset forfeiture, or other civil matters) and you encounter a situation in which you believe that a visiting judge who recently lost his or her last election should be removed from a case, recall this opinion and be prepared to argue for removal on some basis other than §74.053(d); for example, because he or she has not handled the level of offense on trial and is therefore unqualified to preside over the matter at hand.

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