Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

State v. Coleman

Nos. PD-0093-25 & -0094-25                1/29/26

Issue:

Did a cattle ranger commit the offense of impersonation of a public servant when he questioned a suspect about a sexual offense and seized his cell phone but did not inform the suspect of the limitations on his law enforcement authority?

Holding:

No. The cattle ranger did not have the required intent to violate the impersonation statute (Penal Code §37.11). An attorney called the cattle ranger (employed by the Texas & Southwest Cattle Raisers Association) to ask him to look into the defendant’s involvement exchanging nude pictures with a minor on Snapchat. The cattle ranger went to the defendant’s house, introduced himself by name, said he had been “working with this county for a long time,” had been with the Texas Rangers, had worked for the Sheriff’s Department, and now worked for the cattle rangers. The cattle ranger recorded his conversation with the defendant, in which the defendant admitted to exchanging 15–20 photos on Snapchat with the child, including some of the defendant’s genitals. The ranger also seized the defendant’s phone. 

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the statement, based on Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 2A.006(c) (formerly numbered Art. 2.125(b)), which limits a cattle ranger’s authority to “an offense involving livestock or related property.” The court of appeals upheld the motion to suppress but based its ruling on a conclusion that the cattle ranger had violated §37.11.

The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, concluded that to impersonate a public servant, the actor must have falsely represented himself to be a public servant. “And when the actor is one type of public servant and is alleged to have impersonated a different type of public servant, the actor must have falsely represented himself to be the type of public servant that he is alleged to have impersonated. Under that understanding of ‘impersonate,’ we conclude that the evidence falls short of showing it. Read opinion.

Concurrence (Schenck, P.J.):

“While I join the majority, I write separately to voice my agreement with Judge Newell that this Court in the right case should reconsider its construction of Article 38.23. … Our precedent appears to be at odds with the plain language of the statute.” Read concurrence.

Dissent (Newell, J., joined by Richardson and Walker, JJ.):

“[A]s near as I can tell, the Court does not disturb the court of appeals holding that impersonating a peace officer is the type of statutory violation that allows a defendant to invoke the Article 38.23 exclusionary rule. The Court also does not disturb the court of appeals holding that [the defendant] had standing to challenge the admission of his statement. And the Court does not disturb the court of appeals holding that the ‘cattle ranger’ lacked authority to investigate. The opinion appears to be limited to evaluating the evidentiary support for the alleged impersonation of a peace officer, or at least it was until I pointed that out. I fear that by taking this approach the Court’s opinion is largely advisory as it would not impact the court of appeals holding below.” Read dissent.

Commentary:

Never heard of a “cattle ranger” before? Join the club. Aside from educating us about the existence of cattle rangers as public servants, as well as the legitimate scope of cattle rangers’ authority, the majority opinion reminds us that a defendant cannot invoke Article 38.23’s exclusionary rule unless the defendant can demonstrate “standing”—i.e., that the defendant has actually suffered an infringement of a legal right. Importantly, too, the CCA also explains that, under current precedent, an infringement does not occur—and therefore standing to invoke Article 38.23 does not arise—simply because a law enforcement officer lacked statutory authority to conduct an investigation. Beyond that, the majority opinion engages in a thorough dive into what constitutes “impersonation” for purposes of the crime of impersonation of a public servant. So, even if the facts of this case aren’t typical, the majority opinion could prove useful for your next impersonation trial or appeal. 

State v. Lennox

No. PD-0284-25                               1/29/26

Issue:

Because the value ladder in the forgery statute (Penal Code §32.21(e-1)) operates as a jurisdictional element, is a defendant required to object to exclusion of an instruction under §32.21(e-1)? 

Holding:

No. In State v. Green, 682 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), the Court held that the value ladder punishment scheme in §32.21(e-1) is an offense element rather than a punishment issue and that subsections (d) and (e) are “ ‘subordinate to subsection (e-1)’ if (e-1)’s purpose element was shown.” Following the reasoning in Green, the Court here found that the trial court is required to instruct on elements of an offense even without the defendant’s objection “because they are law applicable to the case.” The Court concluded that the jury charge mistakenly omitted an instruction under §32.21(e-1) and the “court of appeals correctly decided that the jury charge did not require preservation and was egregiously harmful because it omitted offense elements that might have subjected [the defendant] to a lower conviction level.” Read opinion.

Concurrence (Newell, J., joined by Richardson and Walker, JJ.):

“The forgery statue is messed up. The Legislature screwed it up when it decided to add a value ladder to the statute in the way that it did. Conceptually, it leads to two provisions in the same statute that cannot co-exist. I believe the Court properly construes a bad statute as it was written. I would also add that the way the statute was written leads to absurd results. And with no real extra-textual sources to suggest any intent by the Legislature, the only thing this Court can say with any confidence is the Legislature wanted to apply a value ladder to the forgery statute.” Read concurrence.

Concurrence (Parker, J.):

The court of appeals engaged in an involved discussion of jury-charge error at the guilt and punishment stages and accorded a non-standard remedy for guilt-stage jury-charge error. Despite the complexity of its discussion, the court did not connect all the dots—it did not adequately address the State’s preservation argument and did not explain how it could impose the remedy of reformation for a guilt-stage jury-charge error when the usual remedy for that sort of error is a new trial as to guilt. If we connect all the dots, the court of appeals’s resolution is ultimately correct, but this case would be much simpler if the court of appeals had recognized that Appellant’s jury-charge complaint was essentially also a sufficiency complaint.” Read concurrence. 

Dissent (Schenck, P.J.): 

I see it as profoundly unfair to the State, the defendant, and the trial court to suppose that our disposition [in State v. Green, 682 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024)] was so obvious or predictable to the point where this case should be resolved by the operation of default. … I believe that problems warranting appeal and reversal are generally worthy of objection. The majority, embracing the consequence of our decision in Green to treat the value ladder as an element, understandably trips this case into automatic error. I find either disposition undesirable and unnecessary. Read dissent. 

Dissent (Yeary, J., joined by Schenck, P.J.):

The Court suggests today that Subsection (e-1) cannot possibly operate as a defensive issue, but instead must always be regarded as “law applicable to the case”—even when a forgery case is originally pled under Subsections (d) or (e)—because the statute plainly provides that both Subsections (d) and (e) are “[s]ubject to Subsection (e-1)[.]” But such a scheme, as the Court in Green understood, is impractical to the point of unworkability. It places an undue burden on the courts, at both the trial and appellate levels, to actively police whether the prosecution has overstepped in its otherwise legitimate pleading—an anomalous, even anti-systemic requirement to impose on the judiciary in what is supposed to be an adversarial system. And it raises hard questions that the Court today does not acknowledge. Read dissent.

Commentary:

As Judge Newell aptly notes in his concurrence, “[t]he forgery statute is messed up” and poorly written in its current iteration. Be that as it may, though, the CCA has clearly stated in Green and here that the value ladder enumerated in subsection §32.21(e-1) operates as a jurisdictional “offense” element, which the trial court is obligated to include in the jury charge regardless of whether the defense requests its inclusion or fails to object to its omission. As with any other legal issue that the trial court must include in the charge as “law applicable to the case,” even sua sponte (another example is an accomplice-witness instruction, when applicable), be sure to remind the trial judge about this obligation. It not only helps the judge in that moment, but it also helps you avoid reversal and retrial, in whole or in part, which are often inevitable in these circumstances.