Texas Courts of Appeals
Woods and Davis v. State
No. 01-23-00818-CV 10/7/25
Issue:
In an asset forfeiture case, was the evidence legally sufficient to support a jury’s finding that money seized was intended to be used to possess a controlled substance?
Holding:
No. The Court held that no direct evidence tied two large bundles of money wrapped in plastic to the defendant’s possession of a controlled substance. The defendant was traveling from Mississippi to Houston when stopped by law enforcement. Deputies described his demeanor as nervous. After deputies seized the money, a narcotics dog alerted to the odor of one of five controlled substances, but they found no narcotics or paraphernalia, and the defendant was not charged with any crime. During the asset forfeiture proceeding, one of the deputies testified that during the traffic stop, the defendant talked about his cousin’s drug-trafficking boyfriend, but the Court noted that this “amounts to little more than what [the deputy] himself characterized as ‘small talk.’” The Court concluded that because “mere knowledge of someone involved in drug trafficking is just as consistent with innocent conduct as commission of one of the enumerated offenses, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the case was ‘intended to be used in the commission of the possession of a Controlled Substance.’” Read opinion.
Commentary:
In support of its holding, the court of appeals relied upon several similar decisions from other appellate courts. Prosecutors involved in asset forfeiture should definitely read this decision, as well as the decisions upon which it relies. A defendant’s general knowledge of drug trafficking or the positive alert by a narcotics-detection dog, standing alone, will not be enough. The court of appeals did not hold that the presence of illegal narcotics or narcotics paraphernalia were necessary to uphold a forfeiture finding, but that clearly would be helpful.
Moten v. State
No. 10-24-00183-CR 10/9/25
Issue:
Did the State have an obligation under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 39.14(a) to seek out recordings of phone calls the defendant made in jail to a witness?
Holding:
Yes, but admission of the phone calls was harmless error. The Court rejected the State’s argument that because the jail calls were stored on a server belonging to a third-party vendor, the calls were not in possession of the sheriff’s office. Article 39.14(a) requires the State to provide evidence in the possession of the State “or any person under contract with the State,” and therefore the jail calls, “although on a server belonging to a company contracting with the Sheriff’s office, were continually in the State’s possession.” And although the prosecutor obtained recordings of the phone calls after the witness alerted the prosecutor to their existence, “there is no explanation as to why the prosecutor could not, on his own, request phone logs and recordings, if any exist, directly from the Sheriff’s office without knowing for a fact that they exist.” Ultimately, however, the Court concluded that admission of the phone calls, in which the defendant did not admit guilt or say anything overtly incriminating, was harmless error. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision follows State v. Heath, but then goes one step further. Heath held that a trial judge was permitted to exclude evidence that was not timely disclosed to the defense. In this case, the court of appeals held that the trial judge was required to exclude the evidence that was not timely disclosed to the defense. The defendant’s conviction was only saved by the application of a harm analysis. Prosecutors should be very careful to determine what evidence is in law enforcement’s possession, including jail calls. If prosecutors intend to introduce the calls into evidence, they should be turned over to the defense.
Haley v. State
No. 01-24-00835-CR 10/9/25
Issue:
Does a hot-wired vehicle qualify as a “motor-propelled vehicle” under Penal Code §31.07 (Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle)?
Holding:
Yes. Even though no witness expressly testified that the truck operated by the defendant was a “motor-propelled vehicle,” and the truck was missing the ignition, ignition switch, and panels, under the plain terms of the statute, it qualified under §31.07 as a motor-propelled vehicle. “That the truck was hotwired (or in poor condition) at the time does not change this conclusion. A rational juror could have found that the truck remained a ‘motor-propelled vehicle’ when it was temporarily operating abnormally through hotwiring. Indeed, the jury could have found that the truck was still being propelled by a motor—or that its nature remained a motor-propelled vehicle.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Ultimately, it was not difficult for the court of appeals to arrive at its holding. The vehicle in this case—a truck—could be driven and was operated by a motor. It did not matter that it had been “hot-wired” or that it was in poor condition. The holding is completely in line with the statutory definitions, as well dictionary definitions for those terms that are not defined by statute. In support of its holding, the court of appeals even relied upon a case holding a motor-powered aircraft was also a motor-propelled vehicle, for the purposes of the statute criminalizing unauthorized use of a vehicle.