Court of Criminal Appeals
Crider v. State
No. PD-1070-19 9/16/20
Issue:
Does the introduction of a defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration test results—without any explicit authorization for such chemical testing in the search warrant (or in a separate search warrant)—violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights?
Holding:
No. “A neutral magistrate who has approved a search warrant for the extraction of a blood sample, based upon a showing of probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed the offense of driving while intoxicated, has necessarily also made a finding of probable cause that justifies chemical testing of that same blood. Indeed, that is the purpose of the blood extraction.” Here, the extraction of the defendant’s blood for the purpose of testing his blood for this specific information was justified by the strong odor of alcohol the officer noticed when he first confronted the defendant and found him to exhibit characteristics of intoxication―facts noted by the neutral magistrate in the warrant. The chemical testing of the blood, based upon a warrant that justifies the extraction of blood for that very purpose, is a reasonable search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Read Opinion.
Concurring (Newell, J., joined by Hervey, J., Richardson, J., and Slaughter, JJ.):
“Today, the Court clarifies our holding in State v. Martinez, and reiterates that a defendant maintains an expectation of privacy in the contents of his blood even if police have lawfully seized it pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause. In other words, the Court continues to hold that there are two searches that take place when it comes to blood draws in a DWI case: first, when the police search the defendant’s body and seize his blood; and second, when the lab technician analyzes the contents of the blood. I agree with the Court’s holding and join the Court’s opinion.” Read Opinion.
Dissenting (Walker, J.):
“[The defendant’s] blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant as part of a DWI investigation, and the blood was later tested for blood alcohol concentration. While the search warrant expressly authorized drawing of the blood, the search warrant did not authorize testing of that blood. The Court today determines that testing was implicitly authorized by the warrant because the affidavit attached to the warrant, which stated facts providing probable cause to draw the blood, also stated facts providing probable cause to test the blood. While I agree that there was probable cause to test the blood, I disagree that the mere presence of probable cause means the warrant authorized testing. Because I would hold that the warrant in [the defendant]’s case did not even implicitly authorize testing, I respectfully dissent.” Read Opinion.
Commentary:
This opinion should put to rest the post-Martinez two-warrant kerfuffle in the DWI community.
State v. Castanedanieto
Nos. PD-1154-19 through -1156-19 9/16/20
Issue:
May an appeals court uphold a trial court’s suppression of evidence based on an unargued theory that the defendant’s confession was coerced?
Holding:
No. Coercion theory was not a theory of law applicable to the case because the State was not given an opportunity to develop a complete factual record with respect to that theory. The defense presented at the suppression hearing was based on a Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim and that the defendant did not understand the warnings that were given pursuant to Miranda and Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.22. These defensive theories did not put the State on notice of the need to develop facts at the hearing relevant to a coercion theory. The court of appeals resolved the appeal on a coercion theory that was not a theory of law applicable to the case; thus, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. Read Opinion.
Commentary:
There are several moving parts here. First, interrogators should look at the first interview and think about what to do if a suspect says something that might contradict or undermine a recent statement that he understood his rights. Re-reading the warnings in the suspect’s language or asking a follow up—“you don’t understand your rights, or you don’t understand my question?”—could have solidified this interrogation. Second, appellate prosecutors should not place much reliance anymore on the Calloway/“right for any reason” rule. This is a rule that generally favors the appellee, which is usually the State in criminal appeals. The Court’s treatment of the exception to the rule leaves only crumbs.
Ex parte Williams
No. WR-85,942-01 9/16/20
Issue:
Is the defendant entitled to a reversal in his writ of habeas corpus application based on the allegation that the State procured his death sentence though prosecutorial misconduct?
Holding:
No. The Court denied relief. Read Opinion.
Commentary:
In early 2013, Eric Williams murdered the elected Kaufman County District Attorney, his wife, and his First Assistant. A team of local, state, and federal law enforcement came together, solved the case, and captured him. A team of private prosecutors pro tem, assisted by multiple assistant prosecutors drawn from surrounding district attorney offices and a U.S. attorney’s office, successfully prosecuted Williams and obtained a death sentence for his crimes. Post-conviction, an assistant attorney general and multiple assistant district attorneys have volunteered their time to the pro tems to shepherd the case through the direct appeal and state writ. With this decision, state court litigation ends for the time being. Texas prosecutors should be proud of the tireless efforts of all of the officers and prosecutors involved.
Texas Courts of Appeals
State v. Whitman
Nos. 11-18-00001-CR & -00002-CR 9/11/20
Issue:
Does Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 14.01(b) require an officer to actually witness an offense being committed in his presence to make a warrantless arrest?
Holding:
Yes. There are two requirements for a warrantless arrest: 1) probable cause and 2) a statutory exception for a warrantless arrest. While an officer is permitted to rely on information conveyed to him by others about a matter that the arresting officer did not personally observe to establish probable cause for the arrest, there is still an additional requirement that must be satisfied: a statutory exception for the warrantless arrest. While other warrantless arrest exceptions might not require the officer’s actual viewing of the offense, Art. 14.01(b) expressly provides that “[a] peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.” Read Opinion.
Commentary:
The opinion does not discuss the facts of the case, so it is difficult to draw lessons from it. In these situations, however, remember that officers can also make warrantless arrests of persons in suspicious places and for persons who have committed felonies and are about to escape. These exceptions do not require the officer to have personally observed the offense.
Texas Attorney General Opinions
KP-0332 9/14/20
Issue:
Does Penal Code §46.03 prohibit a district attorney investigator, who is not a licensed peace officer, from carrying a firearm in a courtroom?
Holding:
No. Penal Code §46.03 prohibits a person from carrying a firearm on certain premises, including the premises of any government court without written regulations or authorization from the court. Penal Code §46.15(a)(1) exempts peace officers from §46.03. Under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 2.12(5), an investigator of a district attorney, criminal district attorney, or county attorney is not required to be licensed under Occupations Code Chapter 1701 to be a peace officer. Accordingly, a court would likely conclude that a prosecuting attorney’s investigator is not prohibited by Penal Code §46.03 from carrying a firearm into a government court. Read Opinion.