ATJSI, Criminal Law, Staley v. State, search warrants, cell phones
November-December 2026

Staley v. State addresses Baldwin, good faith, harm, and more

By Britt Houston Lindsey
Chief Appellate Prosecutor in Taylor County

Far and away, the “As the Judges Saw It” column I get asked about most often is the one I wrote on State v. Baldwin, the 2022 Court of Criminal Appeals decision about boilerplate language in a cellphone warrant.[1] In Baldwin, the Court held in a 5–4 split that a search warrant affidavit for cellphone data must do more than recite standard, boilerplate language about the general use of cellphones in crimes—there must be a “nexus,” something connecting this particular phone to this particular offense.

                  In this column’s case, Staley v. State,[2] the court of appeals reversed and remanded a capital murder conviction after finding the search warrant for the electronic devices in the defendant’s home was insufficient under Baldwin, and the State asked the Court of Criminal Appeals to distinguish Baldwin when the devices sought were in a home where a domestic violence murder occurred. The high court instead found for the State on a federal good faith exception and harm analysis.

                  The opinion gives us some guidance on multiple issues that will be useful for trial and appellate prosecutors alike, such as the differences between the state and federal good faith exceptions, which harm standard applies to each, and the mechanics of a proper harm analysis.

Background

Amber Odom began dating James Irvin Staley III in the summer of 2018 and moved into his home about three weeks later with her 2-year-old son, Jason “Wilder” McDaniel. The relationship was not smooth, with Amber moving out and returning more than once over two and a half months. Amber and Wilder moved back in on October 7, 2018. On the morning of October 11, Amber found Wilder lying dead on the floor next to his crib.

                  Law enforcement arrived and conducted a consent search of Staley’s house. Amber showed a detective a series of texts she exchanged with Staley on the evening of September 1, 2018, when she was at work and Staley was home with the toddler; Staley texted her that Wilder had fallen off the bed, had “a knot on his noggin,” and “busted his head and thigh good.” The texts had a Snapchat video of Staley cradling Wilder and explaining that he had “quite the shiner” from falling off the bed. She had also taken a photo of Wilder’s bruised face with her own cellphone when she returned from work, which she forwarded to a detective.

                  Ten days later Wichita Falls police sought and obtained a search warrant, which included the seizure of electronic devices from Staley’s home (cellphones, a laptop, and an Apple Mac Mini). The devices were sent to the FBI’s computer forensics office in Dallas, and on the Mac Mini an FBI examiner found a GoPro video of Staley forcefully striking the child as he slept on the couch. It was determined that the GoPro video was taken the same night as the “quite the shiner” video Staley sent when he claimed the child fell off the bed, and that Staley had downloaded and run a digital evidence erasing program called “CCleaner” several times after Wilder’s death.

                  Staley filed a pretrial motion to suppress the electronic devices prior to trial, arguing that the search warrant was invalid under the 2022 case State v. Baldwin, which had issued between the time of the October 2018 search warrant and the January 2023 suppression hearing. The court denied the motion. At trial the State entered into evidence the GoPro video showing Staley striking the child and thousands of text messages obtained from Staley’s phone. A jury convicted Staley of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison.

                  On appeal, Staley argued that the search warrant and affidavit violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant lacked particularity, the affidavit did not supply probable cause, and the affidavit violated Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Arts. 18.0215 and 18.04. The court of appeals agreed that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, citing Baldwin. Baldwin held that “generic, boilerplate language about cell phone use among criminals” in a search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish a fair probability that evidence of a murder would be found on the phone, because it failed to allege a “nexus” between the phone and the murder that would tie the phone to the offense.

                  The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.[3] The court found that, as in Baldwin, the search warrant affidavit in this case did not allege that there was any connection to the crime and the electronic devices being seized. However, the court also found that Staley had waived error as to the text messages when he made multiple “no objection” statements to their admission. The court found that the admission of the GoPro video in particular was harmful under a constitutional harm standard,[4] saying that the other evidence of Staley’s guilt was not overwhelming and that “the GoPro video is shocking, its impact undeniable. It is difficult—impossible, really—for us to imagine that it was not a contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations.”[5]

As the judges saw it

The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals and was granted review. Writing for the State, Special Prosecutor Lisa Tanner argued that:

                  1) Baldwin should be distinguished on the facts,

                  2) the court of appeals should have found that the non-constitutional error standard[6] applied (given the trial court’s finding that the good faith exception applied), and

                  3) the court of appeals’ harm analysis was incomplete and erroneous.

                  As to the first ground, the distinction the State drew between Baldwin and the instant case was that Baldwin involved a home invasion and robbery by strangers in which the devices were found off-scene, while the warrants in Staley sought electronic devices from the scene of a household murder. The State relied principally on a 2020 Supreme Court of Massachusetts case which had drawn a similar distinction, Commonwealth v. Fernandes,[7] and the Court of Criminal Appeals’s pre-Baldwin decision in Foreman v. State.[8] In Fernandes, the defendant charged with the strangulation death of his girlfriend challenged a search warrant for their apartment, which had turned up a digital camera containing graphic images of the victim at or near the time of her death. Fernandes argued, much as did Baldwin, that the search warrant applications lacked sufficient information to connect either the camera or its contents to the homicide, such that the warrants issued without probable cause.

                  Fernandes found that the type of crime was a domestic homicide in a home, and that domestic violence cases have repeatedly recognized that evidence explaining the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim is relevant and admissible to prove a defendant’s state of mind and intent. “All of this is apparent from facts either expressly stated in the warrant affidavits or reasonably inferred from that information. Accordingly, the affidavits contain a sub- stantial basis to support a finding of probable cause that the digital camera … would contain evidence relevant to the nature of their relationship, the defendant’s motive for the killing, and possibly the killing itself.”

                  Significantly, the Massachusetts Court distinguished one of its own cases, Commonwealth v. White,[9] which rejected the prosecution’s argument that a cellphone will always contain evidence of a crime, because that would lead to a search of every cellphone in every crime. The Massachusetts Court’s language in White directly echoes Judge McClure’s majority opinion in Baldwin that accepting boilerplate search warrant language would mean “all parties suspected of participating in an offense would be subject to having their cell phones searched, not because they used their phones to commit the crime, but merely because they owned cell phones.”[10] The State argued that if the Massachusetts Supreme Court in White and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Baldwin reached the same conclusion on the same reasoning, then Texas should draw the same distinction in this case that Massachusetts drew in Fernandes.

                  The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously reversed the court of appeals, but not on this first ground.[11] The Court instead addressed the State’s second and third grounds, albeit using slightly different reasoning. Judge Parker, writing for the majority and joined by Judges Richardson, Newell, Keel, and Finley, held that the court of appeals’s harm analysis was deficient in the standard that was applied, the mechanics of the analysis, and the harm itself.

                  First, the Court found that the court of appeals applied the wrong harm standard when it found constitutional harm. There are two general harm standards on appeal, constitutional harm and the more lenient non-constitutional harm, and two exclusionary rules for search warrants, the Fourth Amendment and Art. 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In turn, those federal and state exclusionary rules each have their own “good faith” exception, with the latter being much narrower. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply if an officer relied in objective good faith on a warrant issued by a magistrate, even if the affidavit was not in fact sufficient to establish probable cause.[12]

                  CCP Art. 38.23, on the other hand, applies a good faith exception only when an officer relies on “a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause,” which means that some warrants that do not violate the Fourth Amendment will be excluded by Art. 38.23. The good news is that the Court of Criminal Appeals recently decided in Holder v. State[13] that because Art. 38.23 is a statute, the more forgiving non-constitutional harm standard applies. Judge Parker stated that the search warrant affidavit here fell under the federal good faith exception because it was not so “lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”[14] for several reasons. When the warrant in this case was issued, the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Baldwin didn’t exist yet, and the lower court of appeals where Baldwin was then pending later issued a divided opinion with the “spirited dissent” of four justices. A 2015 Arkansas case[15] and the later-issued Fernandes case also supported the argument that the affidavit here showed sufficient probable cause to support the warrant, so a police officer in 2018 could reasonably believe that the magistrate had a legal basis for finding probable cause. In other words, the search warrant was not actually supported by probable cause so the State’s Art. 38.23 good faith exception did not apply, but police in 2018 could reasonably believe there was probable cause, so the federal good faith exception did apply. All of this is to say that the harm here is non-constitutional.

                  Having found that the non-constitutional harm standard should have applied, Judge Parker turned to the mechanics of the lower court’s harm analysis. The State argued that the court of appeals erred in performing a “perfunctory” harm analysis that did not follow the Court’s directive in Long v. State,[16] and the Court agreed. Long held that a court of appeals erred when it found that evidence should have been suppressed but did not discuss the remaining legally obtained evidence in its harm analysis. Here, Judge Parker says, the court of appeals did not discuss the State’s primary and secondary theories of the murder as smothering or strangulation, the medical testimony supporting those theories, the reconstruction expert’s testimony of signs of a struggle and that the crime scene was staged, the DNA evidence connecting Staley to a bloody palmprint on a pillow in the crib, and more. Judge Parker especially noted that “the court of appeals also failed to even allude to the fact that [Staley] expressed antipathy toward the child in numerous electronic messages and in mutilating his favorite toy. Long requires that a court of appeals expressly consider the incriminating evidence legitimately available to the State and analyze its effect on the issue of harm. The court of appeals failed to do that.”[17]

                  Ordinarily when the Court of Criminal Appeals finds that the court of appeals applies the wrong harm standard (as in Holder) or fails to address the remaining incriminating evidence (as in Long), the Court will remand to the court of appeals to conduct the correct harm analysis. However, the Court here opted to conduct the harm analysis on its own, doing so for prudential reasons in light of the State’s briefing under constitutional harm and because the Court had already done the “heavy lifting”[18]—as Judge Parker put it, “because the State’s mechanics complaint has impelled us in this case to painstakingly detail the extensive material evidence that the court of appeals neglected to mention, much less discuss.”[19]

                  Judge Parker then delved into the evidence that the court of appeals neglected to address, and it is hard to read. Staley sent Wilder’s mother numerous text messages expressing deep hostility toward the child and referring to him using racial and homophobic slurs. He stated that he needed to “find a cage for the devil child”; he said he would get the child a “shock collar”; he “punched him in the face and threw him down the tinderbox” (statements he would try to pass off as jokes); he talked about “setting up a false adoption agency” to get rid of the child, talked about getting a dog to “beat the [f***] out of him when Wilder [was] bad,” and talked about a “fantasy” he had of their life without the child and how much happier they would be.[20] He also said that he hated the child and used slurs in group chats with others. Amber testified about finding Wilder’s favorite Mickey Mouse toy with the ears and limbs burned off, which Staley said was done by “the kitchen monster.”[21]

                  On the night of the September 1 GoPro incident, Staley sent a string of text messages to Amber, which Judge Parker characterizes as “gaslighting” her. Staley suggested she was at fault for working and not answering his texts and referred to both Amber and Wilder in hateful, degrading terms. A text from Amber also showed that Staley’s daughter told her, “Daddy did push him; he’s the liar.”[22]  Texts from Staley the night before the child’s death said that he was going to “terrorize Wilder” and “torture him,” and a text from Staley on the night of the child’s death said, “If he cries I’m going to have to stop ignoring him. And beat him (happy face emoji).”[23]

                  Judge Parker details a great, great deal more incriminating evidence, including the testimony of the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, a medical doctor who is one of 400 certified child abuse pediatricians in the country, the DNA evidence, and a crime scene reconstructionist, as well as the effect of the cross-examination of those witnesses and the testimony of the defense experts. It was clear from the forensic and medical evidence that Wilder was intentionally and knowingly killed by either Amber or Staley, and the evidence consistently showed that Amber loved him and Staley hated him. The Court ultimately held that “any error was harmless under the non-constitutional standard. The medical and forensic evidence overwhelmingly showed that Wilder died from smothering, a mountain of admissible or error-waived evidence showed [the] appellant’s antipathy for the child, DNA evidence connected [the] appellant to the bloody pillow that was the murder weapon, and evidence other than the videos provided the jury with a convincing basis to believe that [the] appellant was responsible for the prior incident in which the child was injured. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.”[24]

Concurrence

Judge Yeary concurred, joined by Presiding Judge Schenck (Judge McClure concurred without written opinion and Judge Walker did not participate). He agreed with the majority’s outcome but said there was no need to assume error because error was clear. He places the fault on Baldwin, which he finds in conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Illinois v. Gates, arguing that the Court should disavow Baldwin.

                  In Judge Yeary’s view, Baldwin got it wrong when it held that “boilerplate” language in an affidavit seeking to search a cell phone “must be coupled with other facts and reasonable inferences that establish a nexus between [a] device and the offense [under investigation].”[25] He says this requires the magistrate to set aside any statements in an affidavit based on an officer’s training and experience, as well as common understanding of electronic devices’ common use by criminals and non-criminals alike. Here the affidavit related that evidence sent by Staley was found on Amber’s phone and that in the officer’s training and experience electronic devices frequently sync with one another, making it likely that evidence will also be found on the devices in the home and show who used them. Judge Yeary states that the majority rightly reverses the court of appeals, but at the expense of avoiding the merits, and accordingly “once again fails to reckon with Baldwin’s undue benefit to criminals and their nefarious enterprises. Baldwin should just be overruled.”[26]

                  Judge Yeary goes on to say that even under Baldwin, the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Here he agrees with the State that the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s holding in Fernandes showed how the nexus is established by the type of crime and the nature of the evidence sought, and that in both Texas and Massachusetts prior evidence is admissible to show the relationship between the defendant and the victim, such as photographs and videos that adults typically take of children who live with them.[27] Judge Yeary argues that the Court should at least adopt the reasoning in Fernandes and find that the circumstances of Wilder’s death, the relationship between Staley and the child, the prior incident, and the photo Amber gave to detectives all provided a substantial basis to believe that there would be other photos or videos on Staley’s devices.

The takeaway

The majority did not address the State’s Fourth Amendment argument that this case is distinguishable from Baldwin using the same reasoning the Massachusetts Supreme Court used in Fernandes, because the judges didn’t have to. That’s by design; the Court has cited the U.S. Supreme Court in recognizing “the desirability of avoiding the adjudication of constitutional issues when at all possible.”[28] Until the Court says otherwise, Fernandes is still a decent argument to make with the right facts—there’s arguably a difference between a boilerplate statement of how phones are used by criminals in a home invasion by strangers and how computers and electronic devices can shed light on relationship dynamics in a suspected domestic violence murder occurring in the home.[29]

                  That said, I would not want to rely solely on Fernandes unless the facts had me backed into a corner; the better practice by far is to have affidavits and search warrants that comply fully with Baldwin and clearly identify the “nexus” between the crime and the device to be searched. For example, a search of the electronics in the home could have been justified if there was any indication that the September 1 video Staley sent Amber had been edited, because any editing was probably done on one of the home computers. We don’t often have input on search warrant affidavits and simply get the case we get, though, so that’s an argument to keep in our back pockets. Judge Yeary and Presiding Judge Schenck both would have applied Fernandes here, and Judge Parker has previously recommended adopting it in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Fraser v. State,[30] so it’s at least still on the table.

                  The next consideration is how the court addressed the federal and state good faith exceptions, which affected the harm standard. The Court found that prior to Baldwin, the standard for searching an electronic device had caselaw both in Texas and elsewhere going in both directions, so it wasn’t apparent on its face that this search warrant affidavit lacked probable cause at the time. That means that only the state exclusionary rule under Art. 38.23 applied, and that the applicable harm standard was non-constitutional under Holder. This is important for both trial and appellate prosecutors; if there is a good faith argument[31] relying on persuasive authority in the trial court that a search warrant affidavit is supported by probable cause, make it, and if a court of mandatory authority later overrules or declines to follow that precedent, you at least have an argument that the lesser harm standard applies.

                  Finally, what saved the conviction in this case was, as Judge Parker repeatedly put it, a “mountain of admissible or error-waived evidence.”[32] It’s always difficult to know how much is too much when you don’t want a jury’s eyes to glaze over, but error can be waived when that same evidence comes in without objection elsewhere, or it can be harmless if admitted properly elsewhere or if the remaining evidence establishes guilt so thoroughly that the erroneously admitted evidence becomes inconsequential. Rule of Evidence 403 doesn’t prohibit cumulative evidence but instead requires exclusion if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the “needless presentation” of cumulative evidence. When you respond to such an objection, be prepared to remind the court that the evidence isn’t needless if the defense has objected to the State’s inculpatory evidence elsewhere. Be diligent, comprehensive, and conscientious in your presentation at trial and on appeal, and the facts will make your arguments for you.


[1]  664 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); www.tdcaa.com/journal/boilerplate-in-a-cellphone-warrant-requires-a-connection-to-the-crime/

[2]  No. PD-0202-25, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897, 2026 WL 2870652 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 24, 2026).

[3]  Staley v. State, No. 02-23-00053-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 1526 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 6, 2025), rev’d, No. PD-0202-25, — S.W.3d —, 2026 WL 2870652, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 24, 2026).

[4]  Tex. R. App. P 44.2(a), Constitutional Error, states, “If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.” See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).

[5]  Staley, 2025 WL 727842, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 1526, at *44 (citations omitted).

[6]  Tex. R. App. P 44.2(b), Other Errors, states, “Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” A reviewing court “will not overturn a criminal conviction for non-constitutional error if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or influenced the jury only slightly.” Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This is a much more forgiving standard than Rule 44.2(a).

[7]  148 N.E.3d 361 (Mass. 2020), cert. denied, 592 U.S. 1188 (2021).

[8]  613 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

[9]  475 Mass. 583, 591, 59 N.E.3d 369 (2016).

[10]  Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 134.

[11]  Staley v. State, No. PD-0202-25, — S.W.3d —, 2026 WL 2870652, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 24, 2026).

[12]  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).

[13]  639 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

[14]  Staley, PD-0202-25 at 46-47, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at * (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).

[15]  Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. 387, 472 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Ark. 2015) (“Here, because Johnson was working with at least one other person when the homicide was committed, it is reasonable to infer that the cell phone that was in his possession was used to communicate with others regarding the shootings before, during, or after they occurred”).

[16]  203 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

[17]  Staley, PD-0202-25 at 55, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *48-49  (italics in Staley).

[18]  Id. at 55, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *50-51.

[19]  Id.

[20]  Id. at 10-13, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *9-12.

[21]  Id. at 14, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *13.

[22]  Id. at 19, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *17.

[23]  Id. at 21-22, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *20.

[24]  Id. at 74, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *70.

[25]  Id. at 5, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *74 (Yeary, J., concurring) (quoting Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 123) (emphasis in concurrence).

[26]  Staley, PD-0202-25 at 8-9 (Yeary, J., concurring).

[27]  Id. at 13, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *81-82 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.32 (permitting testimony about the circumstances surrounding the killing, the relationship between the accused and the deceased, and the state of mind of the accused at the time of the offense)).

[28]  Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 (1997)).

[29]  The Court previously declined to apply the reasoning in Fernandes to a murder that occurred in a day care in Fraser v. State, 726 S.W.3d 253, 272 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025); however, as Judge Yeary points out here, the defendant in Fraser did not have a domestic relationship with the victim as Staley did.

[30] Frasier v. State, 726 S.W.3d 253, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 3, 2025) (Parker, J., concurring and dissenting).

[31]  Emphasis here on good faith. It is never right and never worth it to mischaracterize the law or the facts to “win.” Seek justice before victory. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 2A.101. 

[32]  Staley, PD-0202-25 at 64, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 897 at *60.